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INTRODUCTION

-mail and electronic data are no longer merely academic
questions for attorneys and public professionals. The topic has
received increasing attention in legal circles.' The problem

1. See, e.g., Eric P. Robinson, Big Brother or Modem Management E-mail
Monitoring in the Private Work Place, 17 LAB. LAW. 311 (2001); Friedrich W. Seitz &
Lynn J. Harris, Document Discovery in the Electronic Age, 51 FiCC Q. 287 (2001). In
addition, litigation regarding e-mail usage is now being reported in published grievance
decisions. Grievance Settlement, 168 LAB. REL. REP., 279 (Nov. 19, 2001) (citing Chevron
Products Co., 116 LA 271 (Arb. 2001)) (dissemination of an offensive e-mail has been
found to warrant at least a three day suspension).
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with most electronic data is that it can be recovered while most individuals
mistakenly believe it cannot be recovered. 2 As will be discussed in this
data constitute multi-faceted problems for all
article, e-mail and electronic
3 or private. 4
public
they
be
employers,
By now, all professionals should be familiar with both the verdict and
the jury comments in the high profile criminal trial of Arthur Andersen,
L.L.P. It was not the shredding of documents which convinced the jury
that obstruction of justice had taken place. Instead, it was a single e-mail
from an in-house lawyer. 5 The "discovery of a few careless e-mail
6 After all, "[s]moking gun e-mails
exchanges can break open a case."
7
court.",
in
theater
make for great
In addition, attorneys are being reminded to conduct discovery leveled
communications. 8 Thus, counsel and the public professional
electronic
at
must be concerned not only with what the computer system has stored
electronically, but also with what may not be recoverable from the entity's
computer. Consequently, the topic is worthy of scholarly commentary.
9
State and local governments are not exempt from these predicaments.
0 Public
In addition, e-mail usage has proliferated among college students.'

Dale Bowen & Bryan Gold, Policies and Education Solve E-mail Woes, AM.
2.
May 2001, at 8; Patricia Nieuwehuizen, E-mail: The Smoking Gun of the
COUNTY,
&
CITY
Future, The NAT'L L. J., Dec. 11, 2000, at B9.
3. See Thomas Beaumont, Ten State Workers Fired Over Lewd E-mails, DES
MOINES REG., Aug. 3, 2002, at Al, 2002 WL 23123258; Jeff Eckhoff, BroadlawnsAgrees
to Provide Records, DES MOINES REG., Oct. 2, 2002, at B6, 2002 WL 100688324 (county
public hospital agrees to release e-mail and newspaper's legal bills); Okamoto, More Lost
Jobs Due to Vulgar Jokes Foreseen, DES MOINES REG., July 30, 2002, at Bi; Tom Alex,
State workers fired over vulgarjokes, DES MOINES REG., July 23, 2002, at B1, at 2002 WL
23122366.
See Mark E. Schreiber, Employee E-mail and Internet Risks: Policy Guidelines
4.
at
available
also
(2000)
6-9
Investigations,
and
http://www.elronsw.com/pdf/schreiberwp.pdf (cataloging litigation over employee misuse
of e-mail and the internet).
Hays, Anderson Gets Probation, Fine, DES MOINES REG., Oct. 17, 2002, at DI
5.
(noting that maximum fine of $500,000 had arisen from an e-mail message); Jonathan Weil,
et al., Auditor's Ruling: Andersen Win Lifts U.S. Enron Case, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2002, at
A-I, 2002 WL-WSJ 3398009.
at
2002)
30,
(May
A.B.A.J.
E-mailer, Beware,
Krause,
6.
http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/m3email).
Id.
7.
8. Nieuwenhuizen, supra note 3, at B12. See also Conrad J. Jacoby, Electronic
Discovery Requests, FOR THE DE., Dec. 2001, at 39.
9.
See, e.g., Wood v. Battle Ground Sch. Dist., 27 P.3d 1208, 1216-18 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2001) (discussions among members of a public body can constitute a public meeting
thereby violating the state's open meetings statute); Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville,
221 F.3d 834, 846 (6th Cir. 2000) (case remanded for trial on issue of whether a
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universities have had their own problems with respect to student e-mail and
computer usage." For public employers, the problem is compounded by
constitutional and statutory provisions which are not applicable to private
employers. 12 For instance, the Wood v. Battle Ground School District
decision concerned the termination and discharge of a teacher and a
purported violation of an open meetings act via e-mail. In another case, a
local government's promise of confidentiality of certain data stored on
children was found to be invalid and, pursuant to a court order, the
information was released despite the pledge.13
This article will address a few of the areas of concern to the public
employer and counsel for such entities. Specifically, the article will focus
on various elements of electronic data and public employment in: Illinois,
Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin [hereinafter
"subject states"] and federal treatment of those topics in the relevant
circuit
courts of appeal 4 In addition, the article will discuss, in the context of the
subject states, privacy concerns for public employees, public employer
liability for misconduct in cyberspace, constitutional concerns regarding
public employee e-mail usage, and preservation/litigation of attorney-client
and attorney-work product issues in cyberspace.

municipality was found to have created a "nonpublic forum" for speakers by virtue of
hyperlinks to its website). See also John F. Fatino, E-mail: A New Pitfall for Local
Governments, Cityscape at 8 (Dec. 2001).
10. E-mail Helps Students, Teachers, DES MOINES REG., Sept. 24, 2002, at 4D
(noting that eighty-five percent of all college students own a computer and sixty-six percent
have two e-mail addresses).
1 .Staci Hupp, ISU Police Probe Child Porn Case, DES MOINES REG., Mar. 27, 2002, at B 1,
2002 WL 10460260.
12.
While e-mail and other electronic data compilations are discoverable, AntiMonopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 2120, 1995 WL 649934 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), a
public records request would obviate the need for proof of discoverability. Indeed, public
entities have had their e-mail examined without a lawsuit pending. Bowen & Gold, supra
note 2.
13.
State of Ohio ex rel. McCleary v. Robe, No. 98AP-224, 1998 Ohio App. Lexis
6370, at *7-9 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (application for photographic identification cards for
municipal pool usage found to constitute a public record despite representations to parents
that such information was confidential).
14.
Although not a jurisdiction addressed in this outline, Wash. Att'y Gen., Open
Records & Open Meetings:
A Citizen's Guide to Open Government, at
http://www.wa.gov/ago/records/ (last modified, Apr. 1998) discusses a number of concepts
which the practitioner may find of assistance.
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I. E-MAIL AS A PUBLIC RECORD

While the nomenclature changes from state to state, each of the
subject states have statutes which govern the creation of records, storage,
and access to records in the possession of the government. Accordingly,
this portion of the article will address whether a public employee's e-mail
is subject to examination by the public in the aforementioned states.
While there are no specific cases on point in the subject states, at least
one state (Massachusetts) has specifically addressed the fact that its
employees' e-mails are public records.' 5 Furthermore, e-mail constitutes a
record under the Federal Records Act.' 6 Moreover, another federal court
has found no violation of public policy for discharge of an at-will employee
employee was assured the system
over the content of
7 an e-mail when the
was confidential.'
A. ILLINOIS

Illinois has a Freedom of Information Act' 8 for which the Illinois
courts look to the federal Freedom of Information Act for persuasive
authority. 19 The Act defines a public body as:
any legislative, executive, administrative or advisory
bodies of the State, state universities and colleges, counties,
townships, cities, villages, incorporated towns, school
all other municipal corporations, boards,
districts and
bureaus, committees, or other commissions of this State,
and any subsidiary bodies of any of the foregoing.., which
are supported in whole or in part by tax revenue, or which
20
expend tax revenue.
Act. 21
Illinois has also adopted an Electronic Commerce Security
The definition of a public record, under Illinois law, is equally
22
broad. It is noteworthy that the Act specifically provides that instructions

Schreiber, supra note 4, at 17.
Heidi L. McNeil & Robert M. Kort, Discovery of E-mail, BENCH & BAR, Aug.
16.
1995, at 27 (citing 44 U.S.C. § 2102 et. seq. (1995)).
15.

17.

18.
19.
20.
21.

Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/1.1 (2000).

Illinois ex rel. Ulrich v. Stukel, 689 N.E.2d 319, 325 (11. App. Ct. 1997).
5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/2(a) (2000).
See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/5-101 et seq. (2000).
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to staff are public records. Under the Act all public bodies "shall make
available . . . for inspection or copying all public records .
23 The
22.

"Public records" means:
all records, reports, forms, writings, letters, memoranda, books, papers,
maps, photographs, microfilms, cards, tapes, recordings, electronic data
processing records, recorded information and all other documentary
materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, having been
prepared, or having been or being used, received, possessed or under the
control of any public body. "Public records" includes, but is expressly
not limited to: (i) administrative manuals, procedural rules, and
instructions to staff, unless exempted by Section 7(p) of this Act; (ii)
final opinions and orders made in the adjudication of cases, except an
educational institution's adjudication of student or employee grievance
or disciplinary cases; (iii) substantive rules; (iv) statements and
interpretations of policy which have been adopted by a public body; (v)
final planning policies, recommendations, and decisions; (vi) factual
reports, inspection reports, and studies whether prepared by or for the
public body; (vii) all information in any account, voucher, or contract
dealing with the receipt or expenditure of public or other funds of public
bodies; (viii) the names, salaries, titles, and dates of employment of all
employees and officers of public bodies; (ix) materials containing
opinions concerning the rights of the state, the public, a subdivision of
state or a local government, or of any private persons; (x) the name of
every official and the final records of voting in all proceedings of public
bodies; (xi) applications for any contract, permit, grant, or agreement
except as exempted from disclosure by subsection (g) of Section 7 of
this Act; (xii) each report, document, study, or publication prepared by
independent consultants or other independent contractors for the public
body; (xiii) all other information required by law to be made available
for public inspection or copying; (xiv) information relating to any grant
or contract made by or between a public body and another public body
or private organization; (xv) waiver documents filed with the State
Superintendent of Education or the president of the University of Illinois
under Section 30-12.5 of the School Code, concerning nominees for
General Assembly scholarships under Sections 30-9, 30-10, and 30-11
of the School Code;
(xvi) complaints, results of complaints, and
Department of Children and Family Services staff findings of licensing
violations at day care facilities, provided that personal and identifying
information is not released; and (xvii) records, reports, forms, writings,
letters, memoranda, books, papers, and other documentary information,
regardless of physical form or characteristics, having been prepared, or
having been or being used, received, possessed, or under the control of
the Illinois Sports Facilities Authority dealing with the receipt or
expenditure of public funds or other funds of the Authority in
connection with the reconstruction, renovation, remodeling, extension,
or improvement of all or substantially all of an existing "facility" as that
term is defined in the Illinois Sports Facilities Authority Act.
5 ILL. COMp. STAT. 140/2(c) (2000).
23.
5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/3(a) (2000).
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exclusive right to access and disseminate may not be provided by a public
body.24
Requests for records must be completed within seven working days
unless exempted by statute. 25 In addition, the "public body must maintain
and make available for inspection or copying a reasonably current list of all
types or categories of records under its control." 26 This includes a
description of the manner in which public records are stored by means of
electronic data processing.2 7 Charges may be waived by the public body if
the waiver of the fee is in the public interest. 2s In any event, the fees
29
cannot exceed actual cost of reproduction and certification.
The exemptions to the Act's disclosure requirements are specifically
enumerated. 30 "[P]ersonnel files and personal information maintained with
respect to employees, appointees or elected officials of any public
31
Likewise, the Act
body . . ." are specifically exempt from the statute.
recommendations,
notes,
drafts,
excludes from its scope "[p]reliminary
memoranda and other records in which opinions are expressed, or policies
or actions are formulated, except that a specific record or relevant portion
of a record shall not be exempt when the record is publicly cited and
identified by the head of the public body."32 Also exempt is "[i]nformation
related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of a public
body. 33
The exceptions to the Act are narrowly construed and the burden is
upon the government to demonstrate that the record falls within the
Moreover, the government must provide all public records
exemption.

24.

Id.

29.

5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/2(c) (2000).

25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 140/3(c)-(e).
Id. at 140/5.
Id.
Id. at 140/6(b).

30. Id. at 140/7.
Id. at 140/7(1)(b)(ii). A similar provision of the Michigan Freedom of
31.
Information Act has been construed to provide that the names of employees who were
subpoenaed to testify before a federal grand jury or were interviewed by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation were not exempt from disclosure. Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. City of
Warren, 645 N.W.2d 71, 74-75 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).
32. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/7(1)(f) (2000).
33. Id. at 140/7(l)(w).
34. Lieber v. Tr. of S. Ill. Univ., 680 N.E.2d 374, 377 (111.1997). The court also
held that if the exception under 140/7(l)(b) applied, the release of such information would
per se constitute an "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Id. at 378 (citation
omitted).
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which respond to the request,
not merely those that may provide reasonable
35
access to the information.
Furthermore, under Illinois law, any non-exempt record which
contains exempt material must be redacted and made available for
inspection and copying.36 Illinois requires that the denial of a request for a
record must be in writing, specify the basis for the denial, and notify the
person of the right to appeal.37 An aggrieved individual "may file suit for
injunctive or declaratory relief." 38 Attorney fees are recoverable only by
the person seeking the right to inspect or copy if the public body lacked a
reasonable basis in law for not producing the record.39
While the Illinois courts have not yet addressed whether e-mail
constitutes a public record in the forum, some commentary exists on how to
handle the situation in the interim. 4° The authors recommend prudence and
reliance upon case law regarding telephone calls. 4' In addition, to the
extent the e-mail speaks to public business, the better practice is to treat the
e-mail as a public record unless an exception applies.
B.

IOWA

Under Iowa law, a public record includes:
all records, documents, tape, or other information, stored or
preserved in any medium, of or belonging to this state or
any county, city, township, school corporation, political
subdivision, nonprofit corporation other than a county or
district fair or agricultural society, whose facilities or
indebtedness or supported in whole or in part with property
tax revenue.., or tax-supported district in this state, or any

35.
Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. County of Cook, 555 N.E.2d
361, 364-65 (Ill. 1990) (requiring production of computer tape despite the fact that the
identical information had previously been provided in computer printout format).

36.

5 ILL. COMP.

40.

STEWART H. DIAMOND & SHARON L. EISEMAN, MUNICIPAL LAW AND PRACTICE

37.
38.
39.

STAT.

Id. at 140/9(a).
Id. at 140/11 (a).
Id. at 140/11(i).

140/8 (2000).

IN ILLINOIS: PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES,
41.
Id. (citations omitted).

42.

Id.

587-88 (2000).
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branch, department, board, bureau, commission, council, or
committee of any of the foregoing.4 3
Iowa law provides that "[e]very person shall have the right to examine
which
public record . . ."44 State agencies must also designate
copyit abelieves
and
as
records
are public

records and which are confidential .5

i

46

4
Iowa has specifically defined which documents are confidential
(The full text of the statute is set out as Appendix A.) The statute does not
specifically mention e-mail.4 7 Nonetheless, Iowa's statute was recently
amended to treat as confidential that "portion of a record request that
contains an internet protocol number which identifies the computer from
which a person requests a record . . . 48 In any event, the exceptions are
narrowly construed.
Iowa has not yet addressed the issue of whether a purportedly private
e-mail by a public employee would be a public record. Some practitioners
maintain that a document constitutes a public record only when the
5°
government is under an obligation to preserve the document.
On the other hand, in at least one opinion, the Attorney General
opined that a public record includes "not only what is required to be kept
but also what is convenient and appropriate to be preserved as evidence of
Nonetheless, the opinion cautions that "[niot every
public action."'"
document which comes into the possession or custody of a public official is
a public record. It is the nature and purpose of the document, not the place
52
where it is kept, which determines its status. After a lengthy, equivocal
discussion, the office concluded that a "city council only" packet prepared
53 "To constitute a public
by a city administrator was a public record.
record available for inspection a writing need only constitute a convenient,

IOWA CODE § 22.1(3) (2001).
43.
Id. at § 22.2(1).
44.
Id. at § 22.11 (1)(a).
45.
Id. at § 22.7.
46.
Id.
47.
Id. at § 22.7(40).
48.
U.S. West v. Consumer Advocate, 498 N.W.2d 711,713 (Iowa 1993).
49.
50. See, e.g., Clark v. Banks, 515 N.W.2d 5, 7 (Iowa 1994) (per curiam decision in
which the court found the right to examine a record exists if the entity has an obligation to
"maintain" the document).
1981-82 Op. Att'y Gen. Iowa 215 (1981), 1981 Iowa AG LEXIS 21.
51.
Id.
52.

53.

Id. at *17.
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appropriate, or customary method of discharging the duties of the
offices ...
Indeed, the Iowa Supreme Court has observed that the definition of
"public record" is a "record or document of or belonging
to the state or
local government. '
It follows, therefore, until the situation has been
clarified by the courts or the legislature, the prudent professional should
proceed as if e-mail or an electronic data compilation is confidential only to
the extent the message or compilation contains confidential information as
set out in Iowa Code section 22.7. At least one local government has
openly advised council members that their e-mail may be a public record.5 6
Fees for copying public records from a computer may not include a charge
for computer system depreciation, maintenance, electricity, and
insurance.
C.

MINNESOTA

The Minnesota Government Data Practices Act applies to all state
agencies, political subdivisions 58 and statewide systems. 59 The Act
regulates the "collection, creation, storage, maintenance, dissemination and
access to government data . . . . It establishes a presumption that
government data are public and are accessible by the public for both

54. Id. (citing 66 Am. JUR. 2D Records and Recording Laws § 19 (1973) (current
version at § 26 (2002)).
55.
Dubuque v. Dubuque Racing Ass'n, 420 N.W.2d 450, 454 (Iowa 1988)
(concluding that minutes of a private racing association to which the City of Dubuque leased
a racing facility and which had council members on the board were not public records
[subsequently changed by statute]); Hawk Eye v. Jackson, 521 N.W.2d 750, 751-54 (Iowa
1994) (ordering production of Department of Criminal Investigation file for inspection by a
newspaper because report was prepared at request of a police chief when the Supreme Court
concluded that law enforcement privilege found in section 22.7(5) was not met when public
interest would suffer by nondisclosure); Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co.,
283 N.W.2d 289, 299 (Iowa 1979) (no claim for invasion of privacy will lie where
information was obtained from file in possession of the Governor's Office as the public
records statute "permits public to access to writings held by them a [public officers] in their
official capacities regardless of origin"). But see State v. Barnholtz, 613 N.W.2d 218, 225
(Iowa 2000) (conviction reversed for alteration of a public record when the alteration
occurred before the documents were filed with respective agencies).
56.
Council Members Told E-mail May Be Public, DES MOINES REG., Mar. 23,
2002 at 5B.
57.
1996 Op. Att'y.Gen. Iowa 96-2-1(1996), 1996 WL 169619.
58.
Political subdivisions are expansively defined. MINN. STAT. § 13.02(11)
(2001).
59.
Id. at § 13.01(1).
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inspection and copying unless.. ." there is a provision that such data is not
public. 6° The term "government data" means all data collected "regardless
'6
of its physical form, storage media, or conditions of use." ' The right of
62
access includes the right to copy or download. Minnesota further defines
on individuals, 63 data on
classes of data, e.g., confidential data
65
on individuals. 66
individuals, 64 private data on individuals, and public data
In addition, Minnesota provides a cause of action for a violation of the
67
Act which results in "any damage as a result of the violation." Damages
68 There appears to be a cause of action to both
include emotional distress.
70 Willful
compel disclosure, 69 as well as sue for improvident disclosure.
violations shall result in "exemplary damages of not less than $100, nor
The statute, likewise, provides
more than $10,000 for each violation.",71 72
A party seeking to compel
that additional injunctive relief may issue.
to data) may recover
access
obtain
to
attempt
an
(including
compliance
73
• •
action to compel
frivolous
a
attorney fees and a civil penalty. Similarly,
compliance will result in an award of attorney fees and costs to the
75
responsible authority.7 4 Willful violation of the statute is a misdemeanor.
Furthermore, the Act, unlike those in other subject states, identifies which
76
information regarding confidentiality is treated elsewhere.
The statute specifically addresses the governance of discovery
77 "Non public
requests concerning items which are "non public data.,
data" is defined as data not on individuals that is made by statute or federal
78
Only if
law, not accessible to the public and accessible to the subject.
maker
decision
the
must
rules
applicable
the
under
is
discoverable
data
the

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at § 13.01(3). See also Id. at § 13.03(1).
Id. at § 13.02(7).
Id. at § 13.03(3)(b).
MINN. STAT. § 13.02(3) (2001).
Id. at § 13.02(5).
Id. at § 13.02(12).
Id. at § 13.02(15).
Id. at § 13.08(1).
Navarre v. S. Wash. County Sch., 652 N.W.2d 9, 30 (Minn. 2002).
MINN. STAT § 13.08(4) (2001).
Id. at § 13.08(1).
Id.
Id. at § 13.08(2).
Id. at § 13.08(4)(a).
Id.
MINN. STAT. § 13.09 (2001).
See e.g., Id. at § 13.202 (political subdivision data).
Id. at § 13.03(6).
Id. at § 13.02(9).
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determine whether the benefit from access outweighs the harm to the
confidentiality interest of the agency, the person who provided the data, the
subject of the data or the individual identified in the data.79
While the statute does not appear to address the issue of the public
nature of a public employee's e-mail, at least one portion of the Act speaks
to accessing personnel data. The Act provides that a host of information
is public:
-name, employee identification number, gross salary, value
81
of fringe benefits, expense reimbursement;
-job title, job description, educational background,
82
previous experience;
83
-date of first and last employment;
-the "existence and status of any complaints or charges
against the employee, regardless of whether the complaint
or charge resulted in a disciplinary action," 84
*final disposition of any disciplinary action,85 (resignation
or termination does not foreclose the record from
86
remaining public);
-the terms of any agreement settling any dispute arising out
87
of the employer relationship;
88
-work
and89
-payrolllocation;
time sheets.
All other personnel data is considered private data on individuals but
can be released by court order. 90 In addition, restrictions are placed on

79.
Id. at § 13.03(6).
80. Id. at § 13.43.
81.
MINN. STAT. § 13.43(2)(a)(1) (2001). The Minnesota Court of Appeals has
found that the disclosure of employees' social security numbers was not a violation of the
Minnesota Data Practices Act when the disclosure was authorized by the federal Omnibus
Transportation Employee Testing Act. Am. Fed'n. State, County Mun. Employers v. Grand
Rapids Pub. Util. Comm., 645 N.W.2d 470, 471 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (citing 49 U.S.C. §
31306).
82. MINN. STAT. § 13.43(2)(a)(2) (2001).
83.
Id. at § 13.43(2)(a)(3).
84.
Id. at § 13.43(2)(a)(4).
85.
Id. at § 13.43(3)(a)(5).
86.
Id. at § 13.43(2)(e).
87.
Id.at § 13.43(3)(a)(6).
88. MINN. STAT. § 13.43(3)(a)(7) (2001).
89.
Id. at § 13.43(4).

90.

Id.
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information regarding undercover law enforcement officers, 9' employee

93
92
assistance programs, harassment data, and peer counseling debriefing
94
data.
With respect to correspondence to elected officials, correspondence
"between individuals and elected officials is private data on individuals, but
9 5 Based upon
may be made public by either the sender or the recipient.
the position that disciplinary actions are public record, it is entirely
conceivable that an employee's e-mail could become a public record, if the
e-mail forms the basis of the discipline.96

D.

NORTH DAKOTA

North Dakota's public records declaration is found in its constitution:

Id. at § 13.43(5).
91.
Id. at § 13.43(7).
92.
Id. at § 13.43(8).
93.
94. MINN. STAT. § 13.43(9) (2001).
Id. at § 13.601(2).
95.
96. See Edina Educ. Ass'n. v. Board of Educ., 562 N.W.2d 306, 312 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1997) (log reflecting conduct which formed the basis of termination was not data on an
individual). The case is also interesting because it underscores a need for sensitivity to
certain conduct under the Minnesota Data Practices Act. Section 13.04(2) requires an
individual to be informed about the nature of the government's inquiry:
An individual asked to supply private or confidential data concerning
the individual shall be informed of: (a) the purpose and intended use of
the requested data within the collecting state agency, political
subdivision, or statewide system; (b) whether the individual may refuse
or is legally required to supply the requested data; (c) any consequence
arising from supplying or refusing to supply private or confidential data;
and (d) the identity of other persons or entities authorized by state or
federal law to receive the data. This requirement shall not apply when
an individual is asked to supply investigative data... to a law
enforcement officer.
MINN. STAT. § 13.04(2) (2001). Although, in Edina Education, the Court of
Appeal*s ruled such a warning was not necessary because any information
gathered from the teacher (who ultimately was terminated over the incidents) was
incidental to the inquiry. 562 N.W.2d at 312 n.3. See also Navarre v. S. Wash.
County Sch., 633 N.W.2d 40, 50-51 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that letter to
parents which stated teacher would be on medical leave for remainder of school
year did not violate the Data Practices Act), rev'd on other grounds, 652 N.W.2d
9 (Minn. 2002). See also Navarre, 652 N.W.2d at 26 (holding that revelation of
the number of complaints against a teacher as "unusual" violated the MGDPA
because it "went beyond 'the existence and status of any complaints"').
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Unless otherwise provided by law, all records of public or
governmental bodies, boards, bureaus, commissions, or
agencies of the state or any political subdivision of the
state, or organizations or agencies supported in whole or in
part by public funds, or expending public funds, shall be
public records, open and accessible for inspection during
reasonable office hours. 97
The government entity may not abdicate responsibility for open
records by delegating responsibility to a third party. 98 In addition, a statute
provides "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, all records of a public
entity are public records, open and accessible for inspection during
reasonable office hours." 99 A public entity is very broadly defined. The
statute defines such entities as all:
(a).
public or governmental bodies, boards, bureaus,
commissions, or agencies of the state, including any entity
created or recognized by the Constitution of North Dakota,
state statute, or executive order of the governor or any task
force or working group created by the individual in charge
of a state agency or institution, to exercise public authority
or perform a governmental function;
(b). public or governmental bodies, boards, bureaus,
commissions or agencies of any political subdivision of the
state and any entity created or recognized by the
Constitution of North Dakota, state statute, executive order
of the governor, resolution, ordinance, rule, by law, or
executive order of the chief executive authority of a
political subdivision of the state to exercise public
authority or perform a governmental function; and
(c).
organization or agencies supported in whole or in
part by public funds, or expending public funds. 1°°

97.
N.D. CONST. ART XI, § 6.
98.
Forum Pub. Co. v. City of Fargo, 391 N.W.2d 169, 171 (N.D. 1986). An Ohio
appellate court has reached the same conclusion with respect to records maintained by a
third party. State ex. rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Krings, 2000 Ohio App. Lexis 5854 (Ohio
Ct. App. IstDist. 2000).
99.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18(1) (2001).
100.
Id. at § 44-04-17.1(12). Political subdivisions are further defined at Id. at § 4404-17.1(10).
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The term "record" describes:
recorded information of any kind, regardless of the
physical form or characteristic by which the information is
stored, recorded, or reproduced, which is in the possession
custody of a public entity or its agent and which has
or
been received or prepared for use in connection with public
business or contains information relating to public
business. 10 '
The term does not include "unrecorded thought processes or mental
pa ers. 102
impressions," but does include "preliminary drafts or working
of a state court.
A "record" is not a "record" when in the possession
A "closed record" is an exempt record which is not open to the public
and which the public entity, in its discretion, has not opened to the
public. 104 An "exempt record" is "all or part of a record or meeting that is
neither required by law to be open to the public, nor is confidential, but
105
open in the discretion of the public entity."
may be
North Dakota has defined the following documents as confidential:
medical treatment or assistance
-public employee's
06
1
records;
program
-personal information regarding a public0 7 employee
contained in the employee's personnel record;'
maintained by
-personal information regarding a licensee
08
an occupational or professional board;1
°9
-records of law enforcement and correctional employees;
-trade secrets and proprietary, commercial and financial
development records);' 10
information (including economic
I lI
programs;
software
-computer

Id. at § 44-04-17.1(15).
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-17.1(2) (2001).
104.
Id. § 44-04-17.1(5). See also Id. § 44-04-19.1 (regarding attorney client and
105.
work product privileges).
Id. § 44-04-18.1(1).
106.
Id. § 44-04-18.1(2) (the statute does not define e-mail as "personal
107.
information."). See also Id. § 44-04-18.1(2).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18.1(4) (2001).
108.
Id. § 44-04-18.3.
109.
Id. § 44-04-18.4.
110.
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-legislative records and information; 112
-criminal
intelligence
information and criminal
investigated information;' 3
114
-examination questions and procedures;
-financial account numbers of a public entity, elected
official;' 15
official, or appointed
1 16
-lists of children;
-certain records of occupational information coordinating
committee;117
118
-fund raising and donor records;
*patient records at student health services and university
system clinics;'19
-personal and
financial information in a consumer
0
complaint;12
A knowing violation of section 44-04-18 is a class A misdemeanor.1
Denials of requests for records must be made in writing and describe
the legal basis for the denial. 22 Access to an electronically stored record
must be provided, at the requester's option, in either a printed form or
through another available medium. 2 3 Access to a record cannot be denied
on the basis that an open record contains confidential information.' 24
Instead, the confidential portion shall be deleted or excised. 125
Both the statute and case law in North Dakota may allow for the
examination of e-mail; provided, the e-mail relates to a public topic. The
statute provides for disclosure of documents which are "received or
prepared for use in connection with public business or contains information
relating to public business.' 26 Moreover, dicta in North Dakota decisions

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. § 44-04-18.5.
Id. § 44-04-18.6.
Id. § 44-04-18.7.
N.D. CENT. CODE
Id.

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. § 44-04-18.14.
Id. § 44-04-18.15.
Id. § 44-04-18.16.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18.17 (2001).
Id. § 44-04-21.3. See also Id. § 12.1-11-06.
Id. § 44-04-18(6).
Id. § 44-04-18(3).
Id. § 44-04-18.10(1).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18.10(4) (2001).
Id. § 44-04-17.1(15).

116.

Id. § 44-04-18.13.

§ 44-04-18.8 (2001).
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makes such a determination open to question. "Public records are not...
limited to those records which are required by law to be kept and
maintained." 127
E.

SOUTH DAKOTA

South Dakota law provides "[i]f the keeping of a record, or the
preservation of a document or other instrument is required of an officer or
public servant under any statute of this state, the officer or public servant
shall keep the record, document, or other instrument available and open to
,,128
inspection by a person during normal business hours.
Likewise,
municipal records "shall be open to public inspection during business hours
29 South Dakota exempts records which are
under reasonable restrictions."' 130
secret.'
or
deemed confidential
The duty of preservation may be met by maintenance of copies of the
original which meet the standards for records approved by the National
Bureau of Standards or the American National Standards Association.13 In
viewing equipment must be available within the
the case of a municipality,
32
1
municipality.
Under South Dakota law, "record" means any "document, book,
paper, photograph, sound recording, or other material, regardless of
physical form or characteristics, made or received pursuant to law or
ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business.' 3 3

City of Grand Forks v. Grand Forks Herald, Inc., 307 N.W.2d 572, 578 (ND.
127.
1981). But see id. at 579 (J. Vande Walle, concurring specially:
I concur in the opinion written for the court... By so doing I do not
imply that every scrap of paper a public official or a public employee
might retain in the course of his tenure with a public body is a public
record... Justice Paulson in the majority opinion has concluded that the
term, as used in these provisions, implies a document of some official
import to the retained by a public officer or employee in the course of
his public duties. I agree with that conclusion.
Id. at 579.). See also Adams County Record v. GNDA, 529 N.W.2d 830, 838 (N.D. 1995)
("once it has been determined an entity falls under a category of organizations subject to the
law, then by the plain language of the provisions and statute all records of the entity are
open to inspection") (citation omitted).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-27-1 (Michie 2001).
128.
Id. at § 9-18-2.
129.
Id. at § 1-27-3.
130.
Id. at § 1-27-4.
131.
Id. at § 1-27-7.
132.
Id. at § 1-27-9(2).
133.
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The statute further categorizes records as "local records" or "state
records."1' 34
Local governments are required to establish records
management programs; this mandate applies to each county, municipality,
35
township, district, authority, or any public corporation or public entity.
South Dakota has, by statute, declared that records of a private entity
which has been investigated or examined by a state agency are
confidential, 136 and may not be disclosed unless such disclosure is
3
specifically authorized by law. 137 Unlawful disclosure is a felony.1 1
The Attorney General of South Dakota has opined that a public
employee would not have a privacy right in preventing the disclosure of the
employee's salary schedule.
Yet, the dicta of the opinion is interesting.
The Attorney General opined that the outcome may be different if the
inquiry concerned personnel records rather than wage schedules. 14° The
opinion contains the following hypothetical and observation that personnel
matters are confidential:
If, for example, a personnel problem develops and there
was an investigation into that matter, the arguments
supporting the confidentiality of that material appear to me
to be, on balance, much stronger. First of all, the
provisions of SDCL 1-25 provide that public agencies
dealing with personnel matters such as this can deal with
those matters in private executive sessions. To me, it
seems to be logical that if the meeting concerning this
matter can be confidential, the documents and files
concerning this same matter could also be confidential. 141
The provisions of South Dakota's open meetings act is discussed,
infra, at section II(E). Thus, if the e-mail concerns the "transaction of
official business," it may be a public document. 142

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 1-27-9(l) & (3) (Michie 2001).
Id. at § 1-27-18.
Id. at 88 1-27-28 to -29.
Id. at §§ 1-27-30 to -31.
Id. at § 1-27-32.
1979-80 S.D. OPATr'Y GEN. 193, 193-94.
Id. at 194.

142.

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS

141.

Id.

§

1-27-9(2) (Michie 2001).
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WISCONSIN

43
Wisconsin preserves employees from discipline based upon e-mail. 1
The statute provides:

[n]o appointing authority may take any disciplinary action
based in whole or in part on wiretapping, electronic
surveillance or one-way mirrors unless that surveillance
produces evidence that the employee against whom
disciplinary action is taken has committed a crime or
unless that surveillance is authorized by the appointing
authority and is conducted in accordance with the rules
promulgated under § 16.004(12).' 44
Section 16.004 addresses the rule making authority of the Secretary of
the Department of Administration. Section 230.86 does not apply to public
institutional or local government employees. 45 Certain documents
concerning state employees are "closed." 46 Unfortunately, the statute does
not resolve the issue of whether e-mail would be a public record in
Wisconsin.
Under Wisconsin's statutes, "any requester has a right to inspect any
record."'147 A Wisconsin public body cannot abdicate its responsibility for
records by arguing the document was in possession of a
access to public
148
third party.
A record is defined by the statute as "any material on which written,
drawn, printed, spoken, visual or electromagnetic information is recorded
or preserved ...,,149 The term does not include "drafts, notes, preliminary
computations and like materials prepared for the originator's personal use
or prepared by the originator in the name of a person for whom the
originator is working; materials which are purely the personal property of

143.
See Wis. STAT. § 230.86(1) (2001); See also Schreiber, supra note 4 at 17
(describing Wisconsin as the only subject jurisdiction to protect certain public employees).
WIS. STAT. § 230.86(1) (2001).
144.
145.
WIS. STAT. § 230.86(2) (2001); Id. at § 230.3.
146.
Id. at §§ 230.13(l)(a)-(e) (examination scores, dismissals, demotions,
disciplinary actions, and pay survey data).
147.
Id. at § 19.35(1)(a).
148.
Journal/Sentinel v. Sch. Bd. of Shorewood, 521 N.W.2d 165 (Wis. Ct. App.
1994) (records held by private attorney representing district were subject to review). But
see Machotka v. Village of West Salem, 607 N.W.2d 319 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting
duty to reveal names of ultimate purchasers of municipal bonds).
WIs. STAT. § 19.32(2) (2001).
149.
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the custodian and have no relation to his or her office ... ,,150 Moreover,
the statute does not require the custodian of the record to collect or compile
statistics for the benefit of the party requesting the information. 5 '
The right to inspect a record does not extend to any record which:
-contains personally identifiable information which has
been used in an investigation
or which may lead to an
52
action;
enforcement
-contains personally identifiable information which would
endanger an individual, identify an informant15 3 , endanger
the population or staff of an enumerated facility, or
compromise the rehabilitation of an individual in custody
of the department of corrections or jail; 154 and,
-any record which cannot be assembled without
use of an
155
individual's name, address, or other identifier.
Exceptions are narrowly construed. 56 Review of the records must be
allowed in a facility comparable to those which employees use and under
no circumstances does the statute require the purchase or lease of
57
duplication equipment or the provision of separate facilities for research. 1
Nonetheless, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals has determined that sufficient
differences existed between an analog recording of a 911 call and a digital
audio tape that production of the digital audio tape would be required as
well.' 58
While Wisconsin has not yet addressed the issue of whether an e-mail
message is a public record, as discussed infra, a public employee may have
standing to intervene with respect to the release of an e-mail record to the
extent it may be part of an employee's personnel records. To the extent
that the document may be in the possession of a third party, the employee

150.
Id. (emphasis added).
151.
George v. Record Custodian, 485 N.W.2d 460, 462 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
152.
WIs. STAT. § 19.35(1)(am)(1) (2001); see also State ex rel. Richards v. Foust,
477 N.W.2d 608 (Wis. 1991) (no common law right of defendant to examine closed
prosecutorial file which held information which was used to prosecute defendant).
153.
See also Mayfair Chrysler-Plymouth v. Baldarotta, 469 N.W.2d 638 (Wis.
1991).
154.
WIS. STAT. § 19.35(1)(am)(2) (2001).
155.
Id. at § 19.35(1)(am)(3).
156.
Nichols v. Bennett, 544 N.W.2d 428,430 (Wis. 1996).
157.
WIS. STAT. § 19.35(2) (2001).
158.
State ex rel. MPA v. Jones, 615 N.W.2d 190 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000). -
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has standing to object to the release of the information.159 However, an
individual cannot prevent the release of a report which is based upon a
closed criminal investigation.160
While Wisconsin has not yet confronted the issue of whether e-mail is
a public record, its use can violate the open meetings law. 16 1 Further, an email would constitute a public record under Wisconsin law because an email on a public topic would not be the exclusive property
of the employee
162
nor would it have no relation to the employee's office.
II.

E-MAIL AS A MEETING

The factual illustration from a recent decision demonstrates the danger
of e-mail to those bodies which are obligated to provide public access to
their meetings. 163 In Wood, a terminated school district employee brought
claims for defamation and violation of the Washington Open Public
Meetings Act against the school district, the school board, and individual
members of the board. 64 Apparently, a discussion had taken place about
Ms. Wood via e-mail by certain members of the board. As the court found,
five members of the board had engaged in a discussion via e-mail by
retransmission of responses. 165 As genuine issues of material fact existed
as to the board members'
knowledge of the violation, the case was
166
remanded for trial.
A.

ILLINOIS

There are no published cases, to date, regarding e-mail in Illinois.
167
Illinois has an Open Meetings Act which applies to public bodies.
A
"meeting" is a majority of a quorum of a public body.
The statute does
not differentiate between a formal meeting and an informal meeting if

159.

Armada Broad., Inc. v. Stim, 516 N.W.2d 357, 362 (Wis. 1994) (sexual

160.
161.
162.

Linzmeyer v. Forcey, 646 N.W.2d 811 (Wis. 2002).
See discussion infra Part II.F.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 1213.
Id. at 1217-18.
Id. at 1218.
5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/1.02 (2000).
Id.

harassment report prepared by school board).

163.

WIS. STAT. § 19.32(2) (2001).
Wood v. Battle Ground Sch. Dist., 27 P.3d 1208 (Wash. App. Div. 2001).
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public business is the topic at hand. 169 All meetings are open unless
exempted. 70 Exceptions are strictly construed. 7' The exceptions are set
out as Appendix B. A violation of the Act may result in the recovery of

reasonable attorney fees and costs.
Class C misdemeanor.
74

cure a violation.

73

72

In addition, a violation of the Act is a

A subsequent, properly noticed, meeting may

Telephone discussions do not violate the Act. 175 Accordingly, a
meeting which takes place in cyberspace would be a violation because the
public would not have access to the meetings.1 76 Yet, the Act
177 does not
explicitly require public access to an open telephonic meeting.
B.

IOWA

Iowa law provides meetings of government bodies shall be held in
allows a closed session. 78
open session unless the statute specifically
79
Several grounds exist for a closed session.

169.

170.

People ex rel. Difanis v. Barr, 414 N.E.2d 731 (II1.1980).
5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/2(a) (2000).

171.
Id. at 120/2(b).
172.
Id. at 120/3(d).
173.
Id. at 120/4.
174.
Lindsey v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 468 N.E.2d 1019, 1026 (I11.App.
Ct. 1984).
175.
Freedom Oil Co. v. I1l. Pollution Control Bd., 655 N.E.2d 1184, 1190-91 (II1.
App. Ct. 1995); Scott v. Ill.State Police Merit Bd., 584 N.E.2d 199, 204 (111. App. Ct.
1991). Freedom Oil does not indicate how the public had access to the deliberations other
than to state two members were physically present at the meeting site.
176.
5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/2(a) (2000). See also Id. 120/2.06 (obligation to keep
written minutes of both open and closed meetings).
177.
Cf. Id. 120 with IOWA CODE § 21.8 (2001) and MINN. STAT. § 13D.02 (2001).
178.
IOWA CODE § 21.3 (2001).
179.
Id. § 21.5 Closed session.
1. A governmental body may hold a closed session only by affirmative
public vote of either two-thirds of the members of the body or all of the
members present at the meeting. A governmental body may hold a
closed session only to the extent a closed session is necessary for any of
the following reasons:
a. To review or discuss records which are required or authorized by
state or federal law to be kept confidential or to be kept confidential as a
condition for that governmental body's possession or continued receipt
of federal funds.
b. To discuss application for letters patent.
c. To discuss strategy with counsel in matters that are presently in
litigation or where litigation is imminent where its disclosure would be
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Governmental bodies include all boards, councils, and commissions
created by the state,18 all boards, councils, commissions greeted by a
political subdivision or tax-supported district, 181 multimembered bodies
created by other governing bodies including those created by the Board of
Regents to manage and control intercollegiate athletic programs at state
universities, 182 advisory boards, commissions and task forces created by the
Governor or General Assembly or political subdivisions, 83 and nonprofit
corporations [other than county or district fair or agricultural societies]
whose facilities or indebtedness are supported by property tax revenue and
l4
which are licensed to conduct pari-mutual wagering or gambling games. 8
A meeting means "a gathering in person or by electronic means,
formal or informal, of a majority of the members of a governmental body

likely to prejudice or disadvantage the position of the governmental
body in that litigation.
d. To discuss the contents of a licensing examination or whether to
initiate licensee disciplinary investigations or proceedings if the
governmental body is a licensing or examining board.
e. To discuss whether to conduct a hearing or to conduct hearings to
suspend or expel a student, unless an open session is requested by the
student or a parent or guardian of the student if the student is a minor.
f. To discuss the decision to be rendered in a contested case conducted
according to the provisions of chapter 17A.
g. To avoid disclosure of specific law enforcement matters, such as
current or proposed investigations, inspection or auditing techniques or
schedules, which if disclosed would enable law violators to avoid
detection.
h. To avoid disclosure of specific law enforcement matters, such as
allowable tolerances or criteria for the selection, prosecution or
settlement of cases, which if disclosed would facilitate disregard of
requirements imposed by law.
i. To evaluate the professional competency of an individual whose
appointment, hiring, performance or discharge is being considered when
necessary to prevent needless and irreparable injury to that individual's
reputation and that individual requests a closed session.
j. To discuss the purchase of particular real estate only where premature
disclosure could be reasonably expected to increase the price the
governmental body would have to pay for that property. The minutes
and the tape recording of a session closed under this paragraph shall be
available for public examination when the transaction discussed is
completed.

Id.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. § 21.2(l)(a).
Id. § 21.2(1)(b).
Id. §§ 21.2(1)(c)-(d).
IowA CODE §§ 21.2(1)(e) & (h) (2001).
Id. §§ 21.2(1)(f)-(g).
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where there is deliberation or action upon any matter within the scope of
the governmental body's policy-making duties."'' 85 Gatherings purely for
ministerial or social purposes are not "meetings." ' 86
Actions to enforce the open meetings statute are actions at law. The
statute contemplates financial penalties to those members who violate the
open meeting requirements 188 including costs and attorney fees. 189 The
action is void, 90 members may be removed if two prior violations have
192
occurred, 191 and an injunction shall issue against
The
93 similar violations.
employees.'
to
apply
not
do
penalties
statute's
Iowa's statute specifically contemplates telephonic meetings. The
statute specifically provides that a governmental
body may meet by
94
telephonic means if the statutory test is met.1
It therefore follows that a discussion via e-mail by a majority of a
public body would95be a violation because the public would have no access
to the discussion.
C.

MINNESOTA

All local government and executive branch meetings are required to
be open to the public. 196 The statute is triggered when a quorum is present
and the group receives
197 information, discusses a matter,
198 or reaches a
decision. 1 Social events are not covered by the statute.
At least one

185.
Id. § 21.2(2).
186.
Id.
187.
Vandaele v. Bd. of Educ., No. 1-702 / 01-0234 2002 Iowa App. LEXIS 219
(Mar. 13, 2002).
188. IowA CODE § 21.6(3)(a) (2001).
189.
Id. § 21.6(3)(b).
190.
Id. § 21.6(3)(c).
191. Id. § 21.6(3)(d).
192.
Id. § 21.6(3)(e).
193. Barrett v. Lode, 603 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Iowa 1999).
194. IOWA CODE § 21.8 (2001). See also 1980 Op. Att'y. Gen. Iowa No. 80-5-11
(1980) (no violation of predecessor statute when council member participated from hospital
room via two-way telephone hooked to public address system in council chambers).
195. Cf Gavin v. City of Cascade, 500 N.W.2d 729, 732 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993)
(finding no violation of the statute occurred when two council members and a mayor [nonvoting under city's applicable statute] viewed rock which a city intended to purchase
because there was no deliberation and no intent to violate the statute).
196. MINN. STAT. § 13D.01(l) (2001).
197. Berglund v. City of Maplewood, 173 F. Supp. 2d 935, 950 (D. Minn 2001)
(holding attendance at a retirement party was not violative of the chapter) (citing Moberg v.
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 281, 336 N.W.2d 510, 517 (Minn. 1983)).
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copy of the "printed materials relating to the agenda items ... prepared or
distributed by or at the direction of the governing body or its employees"
shall be available for public inspection if the material is "distributed at the
meeting to all members of the governing body," "distributed before the
meeting to all members," or made "available in the meeting room to all
members." 199 Documents classified as not public or used in a closed
meeting are exempt. 200 Before closing a meeting, the body must state on
the record the specific grounds for closing the meeting. 20 1 The statute
mandates a meeting be closed if the meeting would reveal the identity of
alleged victims or reporters of various types of crimes, 202 active
investigative data, 20 3 educational, medical, and health data, 2°4 and for

consideration of preliminary charges against an individual subject to the
discipline of the authority.
A meeting may be closed to evaluate the
performance of an individual subject to the authority or meetings which
would be protected by the attorney-client privilege.20 6
Minnesota holds that the attorney-client privilege exception to the

Open Meeting Law is subject to a balancing test. 20 7 The exception to the

Open Meeting Law applies only when the balancing test "dictates the need
for absolute confidentiality. 20 Minnesota courts interpret the statute in
favor of public access. 20 9 The Minnesota Supreme Court has narrowed the
scope of the attorney-client privilege for public bodies. The privilege is
"narrower for 11
public bodies than it is for private clients. ,210 See also
discussion, infra at section VI, regarding the limitation of the attorney
client privilege to state and local governments. Accordingly, unlike a
private client, public clients are subject to the Open Meeting Law.2
Deliberations closed to the public under the guise of obtaining confidential
advice from an attorney which would make it "nearly impossible" to

198.
Berglund, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 950 (citing St. Cloud Newspapers, Inc. v. Dist.
742 Cmty. Sch., 332 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn. 1983)).
199.
MINN. STAT. § 13D.01(6)(a)(1) - (3) (2001).
200. Id. at. § 13D.01(6)(b).
201.
Id. at. § 13D.01(3).

202.
203.

Id. at. § 13D.05(2)(a)(1).
Id. at. § 13D.05(2)(a)(2).

206.

Id. at. § 13D.05(2)(a)(3).
MINN. STAT. § 13D.05(2)(b) (2001).
Id. § 13D.05(3).

210.

Id. at 737 (citing

204.

205.

207.
208.
209.

Prior Lake Am. v. Mader, 642 N.W.2d 729, 731 (Minn. 2002).
Id.
Id. at 735.

74 cmt. b (1998)).
211.
Id. at 737.
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review the government's decision for "arbitrariness and capriciousness.
Consequently, it is incumbent upon the entity seeking to close a public
meeting to make a record on how and why a private meeting "would
contribute to litigation strategy. 213 Thus, in the PriorLake American case
the court determined that the need for absolute confidentiality did not exist
and, as a result, the subject city council violated the Minnesota Open
Meeting Law, and the case was remanded to the district court for a
determination as to the appropriate penalty.
A violation of the statute is a civil offense (up to $300 per occurrence)
which is not payable by the public body; 214 provided there was specific
intent to violate the chapter.2 15 The third offense will result in forfeiture of
the office.2 16 Attorney fees and costs are recoverable as well. 17
Meetings can occur by interactive television subject to certain
Also, at least one member must be present at the usual
limitations.
meeting location and each location which has a member present must also
be accessible to the public. 19
Based upon the plain language of the statute, e-mail meetings would
violate the Code. Yet, discussions by less than a quorum would-most
likely-not be a violation. 220 Nonetheless, an e-mail could be considered
private data on individuals subject to release by court order, 221 or public

Id. at 742.
212.
PriorLake Am., 642 N.W.2d at 740.
213.
MINN. STAT. § 13D.06(1) (2001).
214.
Id. § 13D.06(4)(d).
215.
Id. § 13D.06(3).
216.
Id. § 13D.06(4).
217.
Id. § 13D.02(1)(l)-(2).
218.
Id. § 13D.03(3)-(4).
219.
See Moberg v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 281, 336 N.W.2d 510, 518 (Minn. 1983).
220.
("The statute does not apply to letters or telephone conversations between fewer than a
quorum"); Sovereign v. Dunn, 498 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that a
gathering is not subject to the law unless the group is capable of exercising powers on behalf
of the body); The Minn. Daily v. Univ. of Minn., 432 N.W.2d 189, 192 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988) (citing Hubbard Broad., Inc. v. City of Afton, 323 N.W.2d 757 (Minn. 1982) (holding
that a lunch meeting between two council members did not violate the chapter)); (citing
Minn. Educ. Ass'n. v. Bennett, 321 N.W.2d 395 (Minn. 1982) (holding that a telephone
conversation between school district chair and superintendent of school district was not a
meeting); see also 1996 Op, Att'y Gen. Minn. (8-28-96) (stating that a violation of section
471.705 [predecessor to Chapter 13D] would not occur if three council members were
meeting as a committee and a fourth council member appeared but did not participate in the
discussion); 1978 Op. Atty' Gen. Minn. (5-23-78) (stating that a violation of predecessor
statute did not occur when city council member consulted with a member of the city housing
and redevelopment authority).
MINN. STAT. § 13.43(4) (2001).
221.
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data available for access by the public, 222 even if less than a majority of the
body were involved in the discussion.
D.

NORTH DAKOTA
223

All public entity meetings are open unless exempted.
A meeting is
defined as a gathering of a quorum "whether in person or through . .
.telephone or video conference.' 224 Under certain circumstances, a
"meeting" can be triggered when less than a quorum is assembled.2 25
Meetings include work sessions but not chance or social gatherings where
public policy is not discussed.226 Like the open records statute, the open
meeting statute specifically contemplates closed meetings for discussion
22 8
with counsel on various topics 22 7 or review of confidential records.
Penalties for violations of the Code are identical to those for violating the
open records statute. 229 Formal action which is the result of an illegal
meeting is deemed void.23 °

The Century Code requires, in the case of a telephone or video
meeting,
or monitor at the location specified in the required
n"
231a speakerphone
..
notices.
E-mail meetings would therefore be a violation of the Code
because the public would not have access to the discussion-assuming
proper notice was given of the contemplated discussion.
E.

SOUTH DAKOTA

All public agencies' meetings, including
subdivisions, are
deemed public. ' The statute does allow forpolitical
the closure of certain
meetings.

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

233.
234.

233

Violation of the statute is a Class two misdemeanor. 234 A

Id. § 13.03(1).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-19 (2001).
Id. § 44-04-17.1(8)(a)(1).
Id. § 44-04-17.1(8)(a)(2).
Id. § 44-04-17.1(8)(b).
Id. § 44-04-19.1.
Id. § 44-04-19.2(1).
See discussion supra Part I.D.
Peters v. Bowman Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 231 N.W.2d 817, 820 (N.D. 1975).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-19(4) (2001).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-25-1 (Michie 2001).

Id.
Id.
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meeting between a board member and an administrator does not violate the
statute.
An "executive or closed meeting" may be held for discussions
concerning the: "qualifications, competence, performance, character, or
fitness of any public officer or employee or prospective public officer or
238
line
,,236
contract
employee, ' 23 9student discipline, consultation with counsel,
239 and marketing and pricing strategies for businesses owned
negotiations,
distributed during a
by the state or political subdivisions. 2 Documents
24 1
closed session do not become public documents.
Meetings can occur via teleconference. 4 2 Open meetings which occur
When the
via teleconference must allow for public participation.
must be
places
or
more
two
teleconference concerns a state-wide entity,
244
established for public participation.
Under South Dakota law, a public policy discussion by a quorum of
the body which occurred via e-mail would be violative of the statute. The
South Dakota Attorney General's Office has previously opined that mail
polls are a violation of section 1-25. 24' No rational distinction exists
between the two media.
F.

WISCONSIN

It is the policy of the State of Wisconsin that all meetings of public
bodies shall occur in open session and in public places unless exempted.246
The statute applies to both state and local agencies. 47 A rebuttable
presumption exists that a meeting has occurred when at least one-half of
the group was present. 248 Social gatherings are not meetings 249 unless the

Retzlaff v. Grand Forks Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 424 N.W.2d 637, 643 (N.D.
235.
1988).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-25-2(1) (Michie 2001). "Employee" does not include
236.
an independent contractor. Id.
Id. § 1-25-2(2).
237.
Id. § 1-25-2(3).
238.
Id. § 1-25-2(4).
239.
Id. § 1-25-2(5).
240.
1989-90 Op. Att'y Gen. S.D. 25 (1989), 1989 S.D. AG LEXIS 10.
241.
Id. Teleconference, as used in the statute, means either audio or video. See
242.
also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-25-1.2 (Michie 2001).
1989-90 Op. Att'y Gen. S.D. 25 (1989), 1989 S.D. AG LEXIS 10.
243.
Id.
244.
1987-88 Op. Att'y Gen. S.D. 260 (1988), 1988 S.D. AG LEXIS 35.
245.
WIS. STAT. § 19.81(2) (2001).
246.
Id. § 19.82(i).
247.
Id. § 19.82(2).
248.
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gathering concerns a subject over which the individuals "have
decisionmaking responsibilit[ies] .... ,,
Closed sessions may occur for deliberations on quasi-judicial
1 discipline
matters, 25125
and discharge of a public employee,252 specific
applications of probation, parole, or crime detection and prevention, 253
purchase of public property when "competitive or bargaining reasons
require a closed session, 254 deliberations by the councils on unemployment
insurance or worker's compensation, 255 deliberations on a local burial
icsinnros257
site,256 certain discussion
regarding specific persons,
conferring with
258
legal counsel, and requests for ethics advice. 2 9
The Wisconsin Attorney General is apparently the only Midwestern
Attorney General to warn public bodies about e-mail. There the office
opined with respect to instant messaging:
.

[I]t would be possible to conduct a meeting of a
governmental body by use of that technology, and in
conformity with the requirements of the open meetings
law. The meeting notice would have to indicate the date,
time and subject matter of such a meeting, and would have
to designate a location where the public could view the
computer display of the members' instant messages to each
other, just as telephone conference call meeting notices
designate a central listening spot equipped with a
speakerphone for the public to monitor the meeting. As a
practical matter, however, instant messaging technology is
less likely to be far less convenient for meeting participants
that a telephone conference call would be.26°

249.
Id.
250.
State ex rel. Olson v. City of Baraboo, 643 N.W.2d 796, 798 n.3 (Wis. Ct. App.
2002) (quoting State ex. rel. Badke v. Viii. Bd. of the Vill. of Greendale, 494 N.W.2d 408,
(Wis. 1993)).
251.
WIS. STAT. § 19.85(1)(a) (2001).
252.
Id. §§ 19.85(1)(b)-(c).
253.
Id. § 19.85(1)(d).
254.
Id. § 19.85(1)(e).
255.
Id. §§ 19.85(1)(ee)-(eg).
256.
Id. at § 19.85(1)(em).
257.
WIS. STAT. § 19.85(i)(f) (2001).
258.
Id. at § 19 .85(i)(g).
259.
Id. at § 19.85(1)(h).
260.
Letter from Bruce A. Olsen, Wisconsin Assistant Attorney General to Tom
Krischan (Oct. 3, 2000 availableat http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dis/spar.asp (last visited Apr.
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To the extent that e-mail can be analogized to a letter there would be
no violation:
[W]here electronic mail is used simply as a one-way
conduit of information from one member of a
governmental body to another member, it has the
characteristics of a letter or a memorandum. It is the
opinion of the Attorney General that the sending of a letter
or memorandum to a quorum of a governmental body is
not by itself the convening of a meeting ... Nor, without
more, does the existence of a reply letter or memorandum
from the recipient back to the sender make the completed
261
communication a meeting.
However, because of the real-time exchange of ideas, the office
warned:
[T]here is a substantial risk that the transmission of an
electronic mail message will result in the nearsimultaneous exchange of information between members
of a governmental body on the subject matter within the
body's realm of authority. In such a circumstance, the
closest analogue is the telephone conference call, which
has been held constitute a meeting subject to the open
meetings law, including the requirement of prior notice.
Consequently, the office cautioned, it "is likely that the court would
find communications to be a meeting, held in violation of the open
meetings law because it was conducted without the required prior
"h
,,263
As a result, "the Attorney General's Office strongly discourages
notice.
the members of governmental bodies from using electronic 2 mail to
communicate on matters within the realm of the body's authority.' 64

28, 2003).
261.
262.
263.
264.

Jd.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
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I.

PUBLIC EMPLOYEE PRIVACY AND E-MAIL

While none of the subject states have specifically addressed the issue,
the case law concerning both the open records and open meetings
provisions would be the most logical body of case law to rely upon in
divining a court's interpretation of this issue in the respective states.
Moreover, the case law dealing with private employers provides persuasive
authority as well for this proposition.
A.

ILLINOIS

The release of information "that bears on the public duties of public
employees and officials shall be not be considered an invasion of personal
privacy. 265
B.

NORTH DAKOTA

No right of privacy exists in an employee's personnel file. 266 It
follows, therefore, that the privacy interest would be lessened in the case of
e-mail transmitted through a publicly owned device.
C.

WISCONSIN

Wisconsin has dealt with the matter via court decisions. Those
decisions provide strongrotection for the public employee-at least from
a procedural standpoint.2 In Woznicki v.Erickson, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court concluded that the "open records law does not provide a blanket
exemption for public employee personnel records" or private phone records
held by a district attorney.268 Such records are "open to the public unless

265.
5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/7(1)(b) (2000). See also Roehrbom v. Lambert, 660
N.E.2d 180, 183 (I11.App. Ct. 1995), (finding that disclosure of a law enforcement officer's
test results is not an invasion of privacy under the Illinois Freedom of Information Act),
appeal denied 664 N.E.2d 647 (I11.1996). The Eighth Circuit has also found that the
disclosure of the fact that a Chief of Police was undergoing psychological treatment for
stress was not an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. Cooksey v. Boyer, 289 F. 3d 513
(8th Cir. 2002).
266.
Hovet v. Hebron Pub. Sch. Dist., 419 N.W.2d 189, 192 (N.D. 1988).
267.
See e.g., Woznicki v. Erickson, 549 N.W.2d 699, 701 (Wis. 1996).
268.
Id. at 700; Cf. Kraemer Bros., Inc. v. Dane County, 599 N.W.2d 75 (Wis. Ct.
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there is an overriding public interest in keeping the records confidential.
Nonetheless, because of the reputational and privacy interests inherent in
such records, the decision to release such materials is subject to de novo
review in the circuit court. 270 The courts are to apply a balancing test
wherein the court is "to determine whether permitting inspection would
result in harm to the public interest which outweighs the legislative policy
271 This is the same
recognizing the public interest in allowing inspection."
272
Yet,
balancing test the decision maker must make in the first instance.
the decision maker need not prepare a detailed analysis of the factors
274
273
involved.27 3 The issue is a question of law and contemplates in camera
inspection. 275 However, disclosure of an entire personnel record is not
required. 76
It follows, therefore, that a public employee has a right to intervene
because of the employee's privacy interests in the release of personnel
27
right exists even if the document is in the possession
This
information.
8
of a third party.

27

App. 1999) (finding open records request would not require that personal identifying
information be disclosed for its employees by a contractor contracting with a county).
Woznicki, 549 N.W.2d at 700.
269.
Id. at 700-01.
270.
Id. at 701 (citing Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 279 N.W.2d 179 (Wis. 1979)).
271.
Just two months earlier, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had held that there was no blanket
exception for personnel records under Wisconsin law; instead, the balancing test must be
applied in every case because the only exceptions existing under Wisconsin law are either
statutory or from the common law. Wisconsin Newspress, Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Sheboygan
Falls, 546 N.W.2d 143,147 (Wis. 1996). Otherwise, the Wisconsin courts apply the general
presumption that "'public records shall be open to the public unless there is a clear statutory
exception, unless there exists a limitation under the common law, or unless there is an
overriding public interest in keeping the public record confidential."' Id. at 146 (citations
omitted).
Atlas Transit, Inc. v. Korte, 638 N.W.2d 625, 629 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001).
272.
Id.
273.
Woznicki, 549 N.W.2d at 705.
274.
State ex rel. Journal/Sentinel, Inc. v. Arreola, 558 N.W.2d 670, 676 (Wis. Ct.
275.
App. 1996).
Law Offices of William A. Pangman v. Stigler, 468 N.W.2d 784 (Wis. Ct. App.
276.
1991) (finding that certain portions of city police officer's personnel file need not be
produced because of connection to undercover activity); Law Offices of William A.
Pangman v. Zeller, 473 N.W.2d 538 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (finding additional exceptions for
production of entire personnel files of police officers).
Wisconsin Newspress, 546 N.W.2d at 148.
277.
Armada Broad., Inc. v. Stim, 516 N.W.2d 357, 358 (Wis. 1994). See also id. at
278.
361 (discussing general right of "privacy under Wisconsin law" and the public policy
interest in protecting citizens' reputations).
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In at least one decision, personnel records were ordered released
because the public interest in disclosure of records outweighed a former
school principal's privacy and reputational interests. 279 In short, under
Wisconsin case law, "a prominent public official, or an official in a
position of authority, should have a lower expectation of privacy regarding
his or her employment records. 280 Likewise, the names of pupils and their
281
parents have been released as a public record.
D.

OTHER THOUGHTS REGARDING EMPLOYEE PRIVACY

Moreover, until the federal courts clarify the scope of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986,282 government employees should be
warned that they have no right of privacy in the system's mail or data
because the system is the employer's property.28 3 Such warnings may be
necessary to avoid allegations of an unlawful interception under federal
law. 284 The employee's consent does not have to be written but may be
implied. 285 Such warnings have worked effectively in the private sector to
286
defeat claims of privacy expectations.
A written policy or warning will have collateral benefits also. A well
drafted policy may well deter a plaintiffs lawyer from taking the case in
the first instance.
Courts have followed the holding of Smyth and rejected claims that an
expectation of privacy exists in the absence of a policy. 28 8

Personal

Kailin v. Rainwater, 593 N.W.2d 865, 874 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
279.
Wisconsin Newspress, 546 N.W.2d at 150 (citations omitted).
280.
Hathaway v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1, 342 N.W.2d 682 (Wis. 1984). But see
281.
Osborn v. Bd. of Regents, 647 N.W.2d 158, 168-69 (Wis. 2002) (holding that educational
records which may be traceable to a specific student's identity are not public records under
the federal Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and 34 C.F.R. § 99.3
(2000); United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding university
disciplinary records regarding students are not public records under FERPA, 20 U.S.C. §
1232g).
282.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (2000).
283.
See Michael Starr & Jordan Lippner, Monitoring Employee E-mail, NAT'L L. J.,
June 11, 2001, at B8; James J. Ciapciak & Lynne Matuszak, Employer Rights in Monitoring
Employee E-mail, FOR THE DEF., Nov. 1998, at 17; Employers are Watching Computer Use
for Legal Liability,AMA Survey Finds, INDIVIDUAL EMP. RTS. (BNA, Inc.) Aug. 21, 2001, at
66) [hereinafter "Employers"]; Victoria Roberts, Lead Report, EMP. L. WK., June 30, 2000,
at 5; E-mail Guidancefor Employees, IND. EMP. Rs. (BNA, Inc.), May 4, 1999, at 4.
Ciapciak & Matuszak, supra note 283, at 19.
284.
Robinson, supra note 2, at 317.
285.
Muick v. Glenayre Electronics, 280 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2002).
286.
Employee Privacy, IND. EMP. RTs. (BNA, Inc.), Aug. 6, 2002, at 72.
287.
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passwords and folders do not create an expectation of privacy. 289 Thus,
"[e]ven if plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their work email, defendant's legitimate business interest in protecting its employees
from harassment in the workplace would likely trump plaintiffs privacy
interests. 29°
In addition, the same court found no violation of the Massachusetts
Wiretap statute when an employer reviews e-mail.2 9 ' Likewise, claims for
wrongful discharge and defamation must fail when the employee is
29
terminated on the basis of an e-mail review. 2
Yet, a "no personal usage policy" may violate an employees' rights
under the National Labor Relations Act. 291 While the Act is not applicable
to public employers,294 those jurisdictions modeling their public employee
bargaining statutes on the National Labor Relations Act could find such a
prohibition troublesome.29 5
At the same time, destruction policies should be created. 296 The goal
of such
programs should be to guide employees with respect to both

288. Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 00-12143-RWZ, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8343 at *3-4 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002) (citing Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F.
Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
289. Id. at *4 (citing McLaren v. Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 WL
339015, at *4 (Tx. App. 1999)).
290. Garrity, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8343 at *4.
291.
Id.
292. Id. at *5.The court also grants grants summary judgment on a defamation claim
that follows termination of employees who had violated the company e-mail policy because
the employer did not defame by telling other employees that terminated employees were
terminated for transmitting sexually explicit e-mail. The court held that the employer had
an "obvious legitimate business purpose" to warn all employees and "thereby prevent any
recurrence of the events that led to this law suit." Id.
293. NLRB Gen. Couns. Mem. Case No. 12-CA-18446 (Feb. 23, 1998), 1998 NLRB
GCM LEXIS 5 1.
294. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2000).
295. See e.g., City of Davenport v. Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 264 N.W.2d
307, 313 (Iowa 1978).
296. David F. Axelrod et al., Hard Times with Hard Drives: Paperless Evidence
Issues that Can't be PaperedOver, THE CHAMPION, Aug. 2001, at 24. A destruction policy
must also address when destruction must cease, for example upon notice of a suit. Ten Tips
for Electronic Record Retention, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 4, 2002, at C9. Counsel will also want to
consider what e-mail should be preserved in the first instance. Michele C.S. Lange, New
Act has Major Impact on Electronic Evidence, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 4, 2002, at C8; Tim Paradis,
Message to Wall Street: Save E-mail, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2002, at C5. "At the present time
employers are employing one of three methods to attempt to control the proliferation of
issues surrounding e-mail: mass purges, employer monitoring, and employee training."
Nicholas Varchaver, Technology: The perils of E-mail, FORTUNE, Feb. 3, 2003, at 96. With
respect to the mass purge, the effect of new federal legislation on this practice is unclear.
Daniel E. Toomey & Tamara M. McNulty, Sarbanes-Oxley: How It Will Affect Contractors
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retention and destruction of e-mail. As will be discussed, infra, a court
may-at a later date-examine the policy with respect to any disputes

concerning reproduction of e-mail for discovery purposes.

In any event, the technology is advancing so rapidly that employee
monitoring may be possible without actually accessing the information
stored by the computer. Instead, the information is gathered at the
keyboard level as the information is inputted.297
IV. PUBLIC EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEE CONDUCT

All employers-be they public or private-are responsible for
employee misconduct in cyberspace. Accordingly, public employers
cannot shun their responsibility by treating misconduct in cyberspace any
differently than conduct which takes place in the physical work space.
Employers must treat the misuse of e-mail like any other matter concerning
298
It follows therefore, that employers must
harassment or discrimination.
investigate cberspace misconduct in the same manner as other types of
Harassment is not constitutionally protected.3 ° Indeed, it is
misconduct.
legal liability which is the motivating factor in employer examination of
employee e-mail. 30 1 In fact, surveys reveal two-thirds of the employers
which monitor employee e-mail rate liability as having a high importance
for monitoring.3 °2
Protection of employees from discrimination and harassment is not
limited to co-employees. The obligation to, protect employees extends to

and Sureties, THE CONSTRUCTION LAWYER, Winter 2003, at 32, 37-38 (suggesting that

failure to preserve e-mail may violate newly adopted 18 U.S.C. § 1519 [Section 802 of the
Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002]).
Devices exist to monitor key board usage thereby not requiring access to stored
297.
information on the computer. Device Secretly Tracks Keystrokes, DES MOINES REG., Mar.
26, 2002, at D3. Consequently, wire tap issues are not a concern when a keystroke
regarding device is used. United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572, 581 (D. N.J. 2001).
However, the record in Scarfo appears to suggest that the key stroke device was not in use
simultaneously with the modem. Id. at 582.
Roberts, supra note 283.
298.
Id. Both Title VII and state equivalents "require employers to take affirmative
299.
steps to maintain a workplace free of harassment and to investigate and take prompt and
effective remedial action when potentially harassing conduct is discovered." Garrity, at *4
(citing Faragher v. City of Boca Rotan, 524 U.S. 775 (1998)); Coll.-Town Div. of Interco,
Inc. v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 400 Mass. 156, 163-67 (1987); Autoli ASP,
Inc. v. Dep't of Workforce Serv., 29 P.3d 7, 12-13 (Utah App. Ct. 2001)).
Burns v. City of Detroit, 90 FEP Cases 356 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).
300.
Employers, supranote 283.
301.
Id.
302.
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protection from third parties as well. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission has promulgated section 1604.11 (e) which states:
[A]n employer may also be responsible for the acts of nonemployees, with respect to sexual harassment of employees
in the workplace, where the employer (or its agents or
supervisory employees) knows or should have known of
the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate
corrective action.
In reviewing these cases the
Commission will consider the extent of the employer's
control and any other legal responsibility which the
employer may have
with respect to the conduct of such
30 3
non-employees.

This duty has been discussed in the popular literature as well. 3°
Cases regarding physical phenomena would be equally controlling in
cases regarding conduct in cyberspace. 30 5 The employer's policies can
constitute evidence of the employer's standards and subsequent failure to
protect an employee. 306 Accordingly, public employers must respond
appropriately.

303.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (e) (2001). See also EEOC Directive Transmittal 915.003
(Dec. 2, 2002) (stating that "employers may not rely on coworker, customer, or client
discomfort... If an employer takes an action based upon the discriminatory preferences of
others, the employer is discriminating"), available at www.eeoc.gov/docs/nationalorigin.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2003).
304.
State of Iowa Loses Federal Discrimination Suit, available at
www.advocate.com/htm/news/102700/102700newsO3.asp (last visited May 4, 2002); Court
Cases of Note: Employee Wins Bias Suit Against State of Iowa, available at
www.hrc.org/worknet/workalert/2000/0310/articlel 3.asp (last visited May 4, 2002).
305.
See EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(holding employer liable for harassment by non-employees because female lobby attendant
was required to wear a sexually provocative costume); 34 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA,
Inc.) 1887, EEOC Dec. 6841 (liability found where a waitress informed employer of a
customer's unwelcome acts). See also Weiland v. El Kram, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 2d 1142,
1152-54 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (collecting cases).
306.
Clark Kaufman, Gaming Officer Wins Sex Bias Lawsuit, DES MOINEs REG.,
Oct. 25, 2000, at Al.
307.
There is, however, state court authority to the contrary. Surprisingly, the case is
a California decision. Mike McKee, Workers Can't Sue if Harassed by Customers, THE
RECORDER, Oct, 30, 2002 (citing a California Second District Court of Appeals decision,
Salazar v. Diversified Paratransit, Inc. B142840 (holding that the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act provides no cause of action for employees who are harassed
by customers)) availableat www.law.com (last visited Oct. 30, 2002).
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With respect to abuse by the employee (or former employee), the
employer may have an additional remedy or negotiation angle. Counsel
would be well advised in the context of dispute with a present or former
employee to consider whether the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
3 °8
would provide any remedies to the employer under the circumstances.
V. E-MAIL AND THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
In addition to the privacy issues discussed supra, most of the subject
jurisdictions have ruled upon conduct coming within the scope of the
'
protection of the First Amendment under the "Pickering doctrine.
Generally speaking, a public employee does not abandon her rights to free
speech upon becoming a public employee. 310 No compelling rationale
exists to believe public employees would be subject to a different test in
cyberspace. Nonetheless, it is frequently difficult to draw the line between
speech and insubordination. Pickering, its progeny, and lower court
treatment have struggled to apply this frequently troublesome doctrine.
Pickering challenged his termination from public employment on First
and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. 31' The United States Supreme Court
provided "statements by public officials on matters of public concern must
the fact that the
protection despite
,,312
be accorded First Amendment
....
the Court held
Thus,
superiors.
nominal
their
at
statements are directed
made" a
recklessly
or
knowingly
that "absent proof of false statements
public employee's exercise of the "right to speak on issues of public
importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public
employment." 3'
314
The Court subsequently articulated the following test: In order to be
constitutionally protected speech, first the statement must be of a "public

18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000).
308.
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
309.
Private employers, while not subject to Pickering, still have their share of
310.
disputes regarding personal expression and the rejection of certain diversity initiatives. See,
e.g., J. Bandler, Protests About Gay Tolerance Prompt Firings, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2002
,at B1 (recounting termination of employee for forwarding e-mail message rejecting
"National Coming Out Day" "as disgusting" to 1,000 co-employees of a private employer).
But see Altman v. Minn. Dept. of Corr., 251 F.3d 1199, 1202 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that
public employee rejection of program dealing with gays and lesbians in work place
warranted First Amendment protection).
Pickering,391 U.S. at 565.
311.
Id. at 574.
312.
Id.
313.
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
314.
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concern. ' 31 5 The content of the speech is examined by the "content, form,
and context of a given statement. '3 1 6 "To presume that all matters which
transpire within a government office are of public concern would mean that
virtually every remark-and certainly every criticism directed at a public
3 17
official-would plant the seed of a constitutional case.,
Next, the court should analyze the "the manner, time, and place" of
the speech.318 If the statements are not regarding a public concern, the
individual can be terminated. 319 "Perhaps the government employer's
dismissal of the worker may not be fair, but ordinary dismissals from
government service which violate no fixed tenure or applicable statute or
regulation are not subject to judicial review even if the reasons for the
dismissal are alleged to be mistaken or unreasonable., 320 Accordingly,
some practitioners caution that, prior to taking action against an employee,
a public employer should be able to articulate a nonspeech related rationale
for the action and "rely solely on the nonspeech matters.' 32 '
Assuming the statement concerns a public matter, the court must then
consider the governmental interest in effective and efficient operations.322
Deference must be given to the government should the speech damage
"close working relationships. 323 If the speech involves a matter of public
concern, the government's burden becomes heavier.32 4
The subject states have articulated similar tests. 32 5 Burkes cogently
describes the public employer's burden. 326 First, the speech must concern a

315.
Id. at 146.
316.
Id. at 147-48. The test necessarily requires some public communication of the
issue. Private comments are not protected. Skaarup v. City of North Las Vegas, 320 F.3d
1040, 1043 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding no violation of free speech right where comments were
made to private individuals and no effort was made to address the allegations to superiors or
the public).
317. Connick, 461 U.S. at 149.
318.
Id. at 152.
319. Id. at 146.
320. Id. at 147.
321.
First Amendment: Attorney Warns Managers Not to Act Quickly Where
Employee Free Speech Issues Involved, INDIVIDUAL EMP. RTS. (BNA, Inc.) Oct. 15, 2002, at
6.
322. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150.
323. Id. at 151-52.
324. Id. at 152.
325. See Zientra v. Long Creek Township, 569 N.E.2d 1299, 1310-11 (111. App. Ct.
1991); Bd. of Educ. v. Youel, 282 N.W.2d 677 (Iowa 1979); Cybyske v. Indep. Sch. Dist.
No. 196, 347 N.W.2d 256, 262-263 (Minn. 1984); Levake v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No.656, 625
N.W.2d 502, 508-09 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); Burkes v. Klauser, 517 N.W.2d 503, 510 (Wis.
1994). See also Altman v. Minn. Dept. of Corr., 251 F.3d 1199, 1202-03 (8th Cir. 2001);
Wainscott v. Henry, 315 F.3d 844 (7th Cir. 2003); Khuans v. Sch. Dist., 123 F.3d 1010,
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public issue.327 The reviewing court must weigh the employee's interest in
the speech against the employer's right to "efficient and effective
fulfillment of its responsibilities." 328 If the employee can demonstrate the
first two factors, she must prove "that protected speech 'was a motivating
factor'

329
in that detrimental employment decision.,

Assuming the

employee has demonstrated that all three factors rest in the employee's
favor, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate that 330it would
activity.
have terminated the employee even without the protected
In actuality, the test is difficult to apply with any level of
predictability because the analysis is inherently fact specific. As the Eighth
Circuit has described it, the test employs a case-by-case balancing test
rather than strict scrutiny. 331 Two recent Eighth Circuit cases illustrate the
difficulty. In March, 2002, just a few days apart, separate panels of the
Eighth Circuit held that a spouse does not have standing to assert a
violation of her freedom of speech arising out of her husband's
333
332 A different panel reached a contrary result.
employment with a city.

The other circuit courts which have examined the issue (the Fourth, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits) have held "that only the public employee directly
subject to discipline has standing to challenge an ordinance on First
Amendment grounds., 334 In fact, one335commentator has noted the
dichotomy in the Eighth Circuit's position.
From a procedural standpoint, a Pickering dispute will, most likely,
involve some level of fact finding and is not subject to dismissal on the
face of the complaint because of the factual nature of the inquiry. A
decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
1013 (7th Cir. 1997); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 848 (1986).
517 N.W.2d at 510.
326.
Id.
327.
Id. See also Burnham v. lanni, 119 F.3d 668, 679 (8th Cir. 1997) (requiring
328.
demonstration by government that suppressed conduct, i.e., display of photographs at state
university, would have "substantially" interfered with government operations).
Burkes, 517 N.W.2d at 510 (citations omitted).
329.
Id.
330.
Int'l Ass'n v. City of Kan. City, 220 F.3d 969, 973 (8th Cir. 2000).
331.
Naucke v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923 (8th Cir. 2002).
332.
Int'l Assoc'n of Firefighters Local 2665 v. City of Ferguson, 283 F.3d 969 (8th
333.
Cir. 2002).
Gary Young, Circuit Splits: Politically Active Wife Stands and Fights, NAT'L
334.
L.J., Apr. 15, 2002, at B5. See also Qvyjt v. Lin, 932 F. Supp. 1100, 1108-09 (N.D. Ill
1996) (rejecting extension of Pickering to university graduate students); Sheppard v.
Beerman, 317 F.3d 351 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing applicability of Pickering to judicial
clerks).
U.S. Constitution, INDIVIDUAL EMP. RTS. (BNA, Inc.) Apr. 16, 2002, at 39.
335.
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demonstrates that the Pickering factors cannot be resolved at the judgment
on the pleadings stage.336 Instead, the issue is properly resolved at the
summary judgment stage after the parties have conducted discovery.33 7
After all, justification for the adverse employment action is an affirmative
defense which must be pled and proven by the government agency. 338
However, speculation as to the rationale for the government's conduct
cannot be used as a basis to defeat a summary judgment motion.339
At the same time, the retaliatory conduct may destroy whatever
qualified immunity the superior may have been otherwise entitled to under
the circumstances.
Qualified immunity must also be pled and proven as
an affirmative defense. 34 1 Similarly, the determination regarding qualified
immunity cannot be made by way of a motion for judgment on the
342
pleadings either.
At least one unpublished case exists from the subject jurisdictions
regarding e-mail which discusses the constitutional notion of public
employee speech. 343- In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit rejected the argument that a quote from Gloria Steinem
was protected speech as the "speech" (a quotation following the signature
on an employee's e-mail) was not a matter of public concern and was
"vulgar."344
Moreover, various issues from the jurisdictions under consideration
would reflect other matters concerning public employees' First
Amendment rights. North Dakota law provides public officers and

336.
Gustafson v. Jones, 117 F.3d 1015 (7th Cir. 1997) (reversing district court
determination that defendants were entitled to judgment on the pleadings when officers who
had made complaints to co-employees and their union concerning new policy were
transferred and passed over for promotions). But see Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143 (2d
Cir. 2002) (affirming summary judgment ruling against police officer employed in computer
information division based upon mailing of anti-black and anti-semitic messages from his
private residence).
337.
See Gustafson, 117 F.3d at 1019.
338.
Id.
339.
Ways v. City of Lincoln, 206 F. Supp. 2d 978, 982 (D. Neb. 2002) (holding that
party cannot speculate as to the meaning of silence by a city council in response to a public
comment as an admission against a city).
340.
Id. at 1020-21. See also Mansoor v. Trank, No. 02-1277 (4th Cir. Feb. 2003)
(denying motion for summary judgment wherein district court rejected qualified immunity
based upon concession that police department had no interest in restricting protected speech
but did so as part of a return to work agreement).
341.
Sparr v. Ward, 306 F.3d 589 (8th Cir. 2002).
342.
Id.
343.
Pichelmann v. Madsen, 31 Fed. Appx. 322 (7th Cir. 2002).
344.
Id. at 326.
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3 45
Such rights
employees the right to comment concerning a public record.
346
contract.
by
cannot be changed
While not one of the states under examination, counsel would be well
advised to review a recent case decided by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concerning "academic freedom" and the
34 7 In this case, certain
unfettered right to pornography via the Internet.
state employees challenged a Virginia law that prohibited public employees
from accessing sexually explicit materials on computers which are owned
348
The Fourth Circuit
or leased by the Commonwealth of Virginia.
349
public employees.
of
rights
the
infringe
not
concluded that the statute did
Moreover, the legislation did not violate the dubious right to
"academic freedom." 350 Given the proposition that academic freedom
would create an exception to the rule concerning public employees (who
happen to be employed by public institutions), the Fourth Circuit stated:

[t]aking all of the cases together, the best that can be said
for Appellees' claim that the Constitution protects the
academic freedom of an individual professor is that
teachers were the first public employees to be afforded the
now-universal protection against dismissal for the exercise
of First Amendment rights ...We therefore conclude that
because the Act does not infringe the constitutional rights
of public employees35in general, it also does not violate the
'
rights of professors.
Closely akin to the Pickering doctrine are political patronage cases.
Political patronage cases are different creatures all together given the fact
that such cases involve the dismissal of high ranking personnel with policy
making authority. The prevailing view, adopted by the First, Sixth,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, finds that the Pickering balancing test favors
the government, as a matter of law, when the employee is terminated for

345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

N.D. CENT. Code § 44-04-18.10(3) (2001).
Id.
Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 404-05 (citing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-804 to -806 (Michie 2001).
Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 409.
Id. at 415.
Id.
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speech related to her political or policy views.352 The Eighth Circuit has
not yet addressed the issue.353
VI. E-MAIL: LITIGATING THE PRIVILEGES AND VARIOUS
DISCOVERY/TRIAL ISSUES

State and local governments must necessarily be vigilant of their
attorney-client and work-product privileges. In order to preserve any
potential confidences, the public employer must start with good storage
practices. Counsel and the client should take steps to protect from
disclosure those computer records or e-mails which a party believes may be
privileged.354 Such categorization will assist in preventing inadvertent
355
disclosure in responding to a discovery request.
A.

PRIVILEGE ISSUES

Certainly, federal question jurisdiction would subject most
government entities to suit in federal court. 35 6 Accordingly, one must
contemplate that a governmental entity may end up in federal court. In
cases involving federal question jurisdiction, "[q]uestions of privilege are
determined by federal common law...,,35 As discussed, infra, the federal
courts are largely hostile to the privileges.
In federal court, the party asserting the attorney-client privilege has
the burden of proof.3 58 While the test is differently stated depending upon
the circuit, the burden of proof includes a demonstration of the following
elements: The information must be confidential 359 and not previously

352.
Rose v.Stephens, 291 F.3d 917, 921-22 (6th Cir. 2002).
353.
Id.
354.
McNeil & Kort, supra note 16.
355.
Id.
356.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Title VII) (2000).
357.
Reed v. Baxter, 134 F.3d 351, 355 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing FED. R. EVID. 501).
See also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997).
358. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 220 F.3d 568, 571 (7th Cir. 2000); Rabushka ex
rel. U.S. v.Crane Co., 122 F.3d 559, 565-66 (8th Cir. 1997).
359.
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 791 F.2d 663, 665 (8th Cir. 1986).

20031

PUBLIC EMPLOYERS AND E-MAIL

waived.36 ° Since the privilege "is in derogation of the search for the truth"
it is strictly confined.
should
Additionally, some commentators argue government activities
362
These
laws.
sunshine
not be subject to privilege because of state
arguments are not well founded in that the arguments are not based upon
the specific language of individual state statutes or case law. Indeed, most
least to
of the states under consideration have specifically preserved-at
ruling. 363
judicial
or
statute
by
privileges
some extent-the
The federal courts have not yet confronted the issue of whether e-mail,
by the medium itself, constitutes a waiver of any relevant privileges.
Nonetheless, certain technological differences between e-mail and
telephone/telefax communications could provide a factual basis for such an
argument. 3 4
Several federal circuit court cases demonstrate the strong likelihood of
inadvertent (yet irreversible) waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Reed,
a case decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
is instructive for the government practitioner. The case concerns litigation
surrounding a promotion after an African American was terminated as a
fire captain. 365 The promotion of another African American took place; the

Hollins v. Powell, 773 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1119
360.
also Bowne of New York City, Inc. v. AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 485
See
(1986).
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (discussing implied waiver).
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 220 F.3d at 571.
361.
See Jeffrey L. Goodman & Jason Zabokrtsky, The Attorney-Client Privilege
362.
and the MunicipalLawyer, 48 DRAKE L. REv. 655, 658 (2000).
See ILL. SuP. CT. R. 201(b)(2); IOWA CODE § 622.10(1)-(2) (2001)
363.
(contemplates right of client to waive a right thereby implying a right in the first instance);
Am.
MINN. STAT. § 595.02(1)(b) (2001) (same); Section ll(C), supra discussing Prior Lake
v. Mader, 642 N.W.2d 729, 731 (Minn. 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-3 (Michie
2001); Wis. STAT. § 905.03 (2000). See also 1991 Op. Att'y Gen. S.D. No. 90-31 (1990);
Op. Att'y Gen. S.D. No. 79-48 (1979). But see N.D. R. EVID. 502(d)(6) (limiting attorneyclient privilege for public entities).
See e.g., Frank P. Andreano, Information Security and the Legal Profession: A
364.
Beginner's Guide, BENCH & BAR, Nov. 2000, at 27 (describing e-mail as data which is
broken into parts and passed through various computer servers before reaching the intended
recipient). See also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 832 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("Messages
between computers on the Internet do not necessarily travel entirely along the same path.
The Internet uses "packet switching" communication protocols that allow individual
messages to be subdivided into smaller 'packets' that are then sent independently to the
destination, and are then automatically reassembled by the receiving computer"). See also
id. ("E-mail on the Internet is not routed through a central control point, and can take many
and varying paths to the recipients. Unlike postal mail, simple e-mail generally is not
'sealed' or secure, and can be accessed or viewed on intermediate computers between the
sender and the recipient (unless the message is encrypted).").
Reed, 134 F.3d at 353.
365.
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promoted individual had not been on prior promotion board lists. 36 6 A
meeting followed which involved the City Attorney, the Fire Chief, the
City Manager and two council members. 36 Plaintiffs maintain that during
the meeting statements were made which substantiated their position that
the promotion was based purely on race.368 Specifically, the City Attorney
had told the council members of his legal advice to the City regarding the
need to promote an African American based upon "the controversy that had
arisen out of' the earlier termination. 369 The district court had granted a
motion in limine which had prohibited the council members from testifying
as to statements made during the meeting. 370 The appellate court observed
that the council members were not attending the meeting as clients but
rather were appearing as "elected officials investigating the reasons for
executive behavior. ,37 1 In short, they were not there to solicit the advice of
the city attorney.
Thus, the council members were third parties whose
presence destroyed the attorney client privilege because the meeting was
not held in confidence.3 73 Yet, the Reed court acknowledged the theoretical
limitations on the privileges for government entities; governmental entities
are not entitled to the same exact attorney client privilege extended to
individuals because the privilege "stands squarely in conflict with the
strong public interest in open and honest government., 374 Query whether
the result would have been different had the City maintained on appeal that
the entity did not intend to waive the privilege based upon the common375
interest doctrine?
However, on another occasion, the Sixth Circuit reversed a district
court determination as clearly erroneous that the City of Detroit's corporate
counsel was not the representative of the Detroit City Council for purposes
of asserting the attorney-client privilege.
Although the issue of privilege
is determined by reference to the Federal Rules of Evidence, with respect to
state and local government entities, the determination of whether privileged

366.
Id.
367.
Id.
368.
Id.
369.
Id. at 353-54.
370.
Reed, 134 F.3d at 354.
371.
Id. at 357.
372.
Id. at 358.
373.
Id.
374.
Id. at 356.
375.
Cf. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 922-23 (discussing
and then rejecting the common-interest doctrine to avoid allegation of waiver of attorneyclient privilege).
376.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 886 F.2d 135, 136-37 (6th Cir. 1989).
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were confidential must be resolved by reference to state
communications
3 77
law.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
concluded that no attorney-client privilege exists between an office holder
and a public attorney. 378 The court rejected the claim of privilege based
upon the belief that the public lawyer's duty is not to protect a client but
the law."
rather to ensure "compliance with
A claim of privilege is strictly enforced by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit as well. 380 As the Eighth Circuit observed:
Assuming arguendo that there is a governmental attorneyclient privilege in other circumstances, confidentiality will
suffer only in those situations that a grand jury might later
see fit to investigate. Because agencies and entities of the
government are not themselves subject to criminal liability,
a government attorney is free to discuss anything with a
government official--except for potential criminal
wrongdoing by that official-without fearing later
revelation of the conversation. An official who fears he or
she may have violated the criminal law and wishes to
with a
speak with an attorney in confidence should
381 speak
attorney.
government
a
not
private attorney,
The Eighth Circuit continued its discussion by projecting the belief
that limitation of the attorney-client privilege in the context of a
governmental entity would not have any ill effects upon a public official
who is considering a future course of action. "If the attorney explains the

Id. at 138-39. See also id. at 139 ("The City concedes that if the Michigan
377.
affirms this determination and orders the City to release the minutes of the
court
appellate
1988 meetings, it will not be able to assert the [attorney-client] privilege").
In re: A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury 2000-2, 288 F.3d 289 (7th Cir.
378.
2002) (rejecting claim of attorney client privilege between state elected office holder and
Chief Legal Officer of Illinois Secretary of State's Office in face of federal grand jury
subpoena).
379. Id. at 293. See also id. ("It would be both unseemly and a misuse of public
assets to permit a public official to use a taxpayer-provided attorney to conceal from the
taxpayers themselves otherwise admissible evidence of financial wrongdoing, official
misconduct, or abuse of power").
380. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 921-23 (discussing
inapplicability of attorney client privilege to governmental lawyers in face of federal grand
jury subpoena concerning criminal activity).
381. Id. at 921.
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law accurately and the official follows the advice, no harm can come from
later disclosure of the advice ... ,382
Of course, the discussion in the Eighth Circuit's opinion did not take
civil litigation against the government into account when making its
pronouncement. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit's decision in Reed directly
demonstrates that the theoretical underpinnings of the Eighth Circuit's
opinion are inapplicable in a civil proceeding. 38 Revelation of privileged
materials could be to the detriment of the governmental entity in the
context of a civil case. Revelation of privileged matters could give
opposing counsel a strategic advantage by revealing all potential arguments
that counsel or the client had envisioned and resolved prior to undertaking
the subsequently disputed conduct. In other words, opposing counsel may
be given potential grounds to attack the government's action which counsel
had not thought of until she had the opportunity to review the privileged
materials. It is the legal equivalent of demonstrating the "chink" in the
armor to opposing counsel. Given the factual and procedural posture of the
case before it, the absence of such a discussion is understandable and
constitutes a basis for distinguishing the Eight Circuit's decision in a civil
case wherein privileged information is sought from a government agency.
In addition, the dissent in the Eighth Circuit decision pointed out that
federal law makes no distinction in the scope of the attorney-client
privilege based upon whether the case is civil or criminal.384
Moreover, a reasonable belief that conversations were privileged will
not save an otherwise unprivileged conversation from being disclosed. 385
We next confront the conclusion of the District Court that
Mrs. Clinton's reasonable belief that her conversations
were privileged is sufficient to prevent their disclosure.
Because we conclude that this issue is irrelevant to the

382.
Id.
383. Reed did not address whether a municipal corporation may invoke the attorneyclient privilege. Instead, the Court reserved the matter for another day because the elements
of the privilege had not been met in the case before it. Reed, 134 F.3d at 356.
384.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 929 (Kopf, J., dissenting)
("I reject the argument that it is proper to ignore the attorney-client privilege because the IC
[Office of Independent Counsel] has the power to attach the label 'criminal' to this
dispute."). The dissent further noted that the Sixth Circuit decision of In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 886 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1989) "implicitly acknowledged the
existence of the privilege for a state governmental entity in a federal criminal investigation."
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d. at 929 (Kopf, J., dissenting). Federal
law has also recognized the existence of the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 929-32.
385.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 922.
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inquiry at hand, we need not examine whether Mrs.
Clinton's belief was reasonable . . . we know of no
authority, and Mrs. Clinton has cited none, holding that a
client's beliefs, subjective or objective, about the law of
unprivileged
privilege can transform an otherwise
one. 3 86
privileged
a
into
conversation
There is at least one reported case concerning waiver of privilege via
e-mail. A waiver of the attorney-client privilege has been found on the
basis of retransmitted e-mail.387
B.

MAKING THE RECORD ON PRIVILEGE ISSUES

Recall that in federal court, mere boilerplate objections are insufficient
to preserve an objection to a discovery request which seeks privileged
matter. Instead, counsel must comply with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5), which
requires identification of the nature of the document and the potential basis
for the privilege, e.g., a privilege log. Specifically, the Rule states:
When a party withholds information otherwise
discoverable under these rules by claiming that it is
privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation
material, the party shall make the claim expressly and shall
describe the nature of the documents, communications, or
things not produced or disclosed in a manner that, without
revealing information itself privileged or protected, will
assess the applicability of the
enable other parties to
388
protection.
or
privilege
A decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
underscores the importance of demonstrating the requirement that
documents withheld as work-product must have been prepared in
anticipation of specific litigation. 389 A general notion that a lawsuit could
39 °
happen is insufficient for assertion of the privilege.

Id.
386.
See, e.g., Yurick v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 201 F.R.D. 465, 470-71 (D. Ariz.
387.
2001).
See also St. Paul Reinsurance Co., Ltd. v.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5).
388.
Commercial Fin. Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508, 513 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
Maine v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 69 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that
389.
under federal Freedom of Information Act agency cannot withhold document on basis of
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If counsel believes that discovery of electronic data will be an issue
confronted during the discovery phase of the case, counsel must address the
issue early on in the proceedings. "[W]here a party already possesses
relevant information in electronic form, it is obligated, by way of
mandatory disclosure, to so advise the adversary. Once advised of the
existence of electronic data, a party may then make an informed decision as
to the manner by which discovery could be produced. ''3 91 Non production
of e-mail-short of destruction-could form the basis at trial for a mistrial
or adverse inference instruction.392
2.

Cost Shifting of Production

Production of e-mail records, for a host of reasons, is an expensive
and burdensome proposition. Nonetheless, counsel should attempt, in the
event of an electronic discovery dispute, to shift the costs of recapture and
production to the party seeking such discovery. Otherwise, mere expense
alone is an insufficient basis to withhold production of discoverable
information as the courts have held "with regard to electronically stored
data, 'the only restriction . . . is that the producing party be protected
against undue burden and expense and/or invasion of privileged matter.' ,,393
It is, therefore, incumbent upon counsel to demonstrate undue
burden/expense or that the requested information is privileged. Such
matters are best resolved by the parties prior to the time of the pretrial
394
conference.

work product privilege regarding expected litigation over adoption of controversial rule).
See also id. at 72 (regarding failure to prepare proper privilege log leading to conclusion
of
waiver of objection to production based upon attorney-client privilege).
390.
Id. at 68-69.
391.
In re Bristol-Meyers Squibb Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 437, 441 (D. N.J. 2002).
392.
Residential Funding Corp v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2002).
393.
In re Bristol-Meyeres Squibb Securities Litigation, 205 F.R.D. at 442 (citations
omitted).
394.
Id. at 443-44 ("In the electronic age, this meet and confer should include a
discussion on whether each side possesses information in electronic form, whether they
intend to produce such material, whether each other's software is compatible, whether there
exists any privilege issue requiring redaction, and how to allocate costs involved with each
of the foregoing").
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Once involved in a discovery dispute, counsel will want to employ
affidavits by an electronic discovery expert who, depending upon the
theory being advanced, can demonstrate burden, or the lack thereof, of
retrieval of requested data.395 Counsel would also be well advised to take a
Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) type deposition of the opponent's computer
personnel with respect to document retention policies and the process
whereby the computer system is backed up. 396
A few decisions provide the key to analyzing the conditions under
which the cost of discovery are shifted to the party seeking such
information. 397 Rowe provides a thorough analysis of the determination a
federal magistrate judge must make when determining whether to shift the
398
The analysis would apply with equal force
costs of production of e-mail.
in those states which have modeled their discovery rules on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. While acknowledging that ordinarily the
producing party bears the burden of the expense of production, "a court
may protect the responding party from 'undue burden or expense' b 9
shifting some or all of the costs of production to the requesting party.
Electronic information is unique in the problems it creates relative to

395.
J. Robert Keena, E-Discovery: Unearthing Documents Byte by Byte. BENCH &
BAR OF MINN., Mar. 2002, at 25, 27. See also Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc.,
52 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 168 (E.D. La.) (affidavits submitted regarding recovery options, cost of
those options, and time frame to complete assignment); Sattar v. Motorola, Inc., 138 F.3d
1164, 1171 (7th Cir. 1998) ("The court denied the motion for the order to show cause
because of the lack of any evidence tending to controvert Motorola's attorneys' affidavits
swearing that no e-mail message had been altered or deleted"); Rowe Entm't v. William
Morris Agency, 205 F.R.D. 421, 424-28 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (summarizing affidavits regarding
scope of e-mail production and associated expense).
396396396. See, Keena, supra note 395, at 27. See also Kristin M. Nimsger, Diggingfor Edata, Trial Magazine, Jan. 2003, at 56 (discussing that a 30(b)(6) witness should be asked to
identify "the number, types, and locations of computers currently in use and no longer in use
•.. the operating systems and application software the company is using, including the dates
of use ... the company's file-naming and location saving conventions ... disk- or tapelabeling conventions ... backup and archival disk or tape inventories or schedules ... the
most likely locations of electronic records relevant to the subject matter of the case...
backup rotation schedules and archiving procedures, including any backup programs in use
at any relevant time . . . electronic-records-management policies and procedures . . .
corporate policies regarding employee use of company computers and data . . . [and] the
identities of all current and former employees who have had access to the network
administration, backup, archiving, or other system operations during the relevant period").
397.
Rowe Entm't v. William Morris Agency, 205 F.R.D. 421, 424-28 (S.D.N.Y.
2002). See also Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 52 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 168 (E.D.
La. 2002) (adopting Rowe test and shifting costs back to party seeking discovery of e-mail
messages).
398.
Rowe Entm't, 205 F.R.D at 428-32.
399.
Id. at 428 (citations omitted).
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discovery. The syllogism between paper discovery and retained electronic
information "breaks down because the costs of storage [of electronic
information] are virtually nil. Information is retained not because it is
expected to be used, but because there is no compelling reason to discard it.
And, even if data is retained for limited purposes, it is not necessarily
amenable to discovery. ''4°° Indeed, computer back-up tapes are not created
for retrieval of particular documents but are instead designed for
"wholesale, emergency uploading onto a computer system.',401
Thus, the magistrate employed a balancing test that analyzed all of the
following factors to determine which party should bear the costs of
retrieval and production of e-mail:
1) the specificity of the discovery requests;
2) the likelihood of discovering critical information;
3) the availability of such information from other sources;
4) the purposes for which the responding party maintains
the requested data;
5) the relative benefit to the parties of obtaining the
information;
6) the total costs associated with production;
7) the relative ability of each party to control costs and its
incentive to do so; and
8) the resources available to each party.4 °2
After analyzing each factor based upon the record before it, 40 3 the
court concluded that the factors "tip heavily in favor of shifting to the
'4 4
plaintiffs the costs of obtaining discovery of the e-mails in this case. 0
After a court determines who must bear the cost of production, the
court must still determine what procedural steps must be made to preserve
confidential or proprietary material.40 5 Accordingly, the Rowe court
fashioned the following protocol. First, plaintiffs must select an expert (to
which the defendant can object) who shall isolate and prepare for review
the defendant's e-mail.40 6 The expert will be bound by both the order

400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.

Id. at 429.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 429-32.
Rowe Entm 't, 205 F.R.D. at 432.
Id.
Id. at 433.
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establishing the protocol and the applicable confidentiality order. 4 7 Next,
plaintiffs expert shall "obtain a mirror image of any hard drive containing
e-mails as well as a copy of any back-up tape. ' ' 40 8 Plaintiffs counsel shall
then create a search term to look for responsive e-mail. Defense counsel is
to be notified and may object to the search terms employed.40 9 Once the
search term has been established, Plaintiffs expert shall execute the plan
and provide the documents to Plaintiffs counsel who will examine such
information on an "attorneys'-eyes-only basis., 4 10 After determining which
e-mails are material to the litigation, the e-mails are to be provided, Bates
All of the aforementioned costs were
stamped, to defense counsel."
placed upon the Plaintiff (who sought the discovery in the first place).4 12
Defense counsel could then assert any confidentiality or privilege
objections and such information would remain protected until the dispute
Production, under these circumstances, "shall not
was resolved.4t 3
constitute a waiver of any claim of privilege or confidentiality., 41 4 In the
event a defendant chose to review its back up tapes prior to production such
415
Moreover, any
review would be at the defendant's sole expense.
withheld documents should be redacted from either the tape or the hard416
drive and an associated "privilege log" created.
Other courts have accepted similar protocols.
Tulip suggests that the e-mails on the current hard drives of
the identified Dell executives be placed on a searchable
CD ROM or database. Tulip's consultant will search the
CD ROM on certain mutually agreed upon search terms
that related to the infringing products or to this case ...If

407.
Id.
Id; Nimsger, supra note 395 (discussing use of mirror-imaging to defeat claims
408.
of spoliation). Albeit useful, the suggestion implies that failure to preserve the condition of
a hard drive, prior to notice of a claim and/or in the ordinary course of business, is, in fact,
spoliation.
409.
Id.
Rowe Entm't, 205 F.R.D. at 433.
410.
411.
Id.
412.
Id.
413.
Id. See also Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 52 Fed. R. Serv. 3d
168 (E.D. La. 2002) (establishing protocol for production and identification of
privileged/proprietary material).
Rowe Entm't, 205 F.R.D. at 433.
414.
415.
Id. See also Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 52 Fed. R. Serv. 3d
168 (E.D. La 2002) (review of e-mail for privilege prior to production shall be at cost of
party on whose behalf the privilege would be asserted).
416.
Rowe Entme't, 205 F.R.D. at 433.
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the search terms generate hits, Dell will review the
documents and produce them to Tulip subject to the
privilege and confidentiality designations provided under
the protective order.4 17
Such a protocol would be fair, efficient, and reasonable.41 8
With respect to incompatible access, one federal district court had
determined that several reasonable accommodations existed to allow the
review of a corporation's e-mail during the discovery phase of a civil
case. 4 19 As described by the Seventh Circuit's decision, the district court
provided the following options. First, Motorola could download the data
onto conventional computer discs or a hard drive for review. 42 0 Second,
Motorola could lend the software to allow review of the e-mail. 42' Third,
Motorola could allow on-site access.422 If the aforementioned options
failed, the district court ordered that the parties would bear one half of the
cost of copying the e-mails. 423 In the Seventh Circuit's view, the options
crafted by the district court were an "entirely reasonable resolution.., and
far from an abuse of discretion. 424 Accordingly, there was no error in the
district court's refusal to grant a motion to compel against Motorola to
produce 210,000 pages of e-mail at its sole expense. 2 5
Counsel for the party seeking to shift costs of production of electronic
records must adopt the following mantra: A party "should not be penalized
for failing to maintain data in a manner convenient to future litigants. ,,426
At the same time, electronic storage of a party's own documents for
ease of access is an entirely different matter. "[T]he decision to transform
information into electronic form for trial preparation is a party's own
business and that decision is not required to be disclosed to an adversary

417.
Tulip Computers Int'l B.V. v. Dell Computer Corp., No. 00-981-RRM, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7792, at *11 (D. Del. Apr. 30, 2002).
418.
Id. at*19.
419.
Sattar v. Motorola, Inc., 138 F.3d 1164, 1171 (7th Cir. 1998).
420.
Id.
421.
Id.
422.
Id.
423.
Id.
424.
Id.
425.
Sattar, 138 F.3d at 1171.
426.
Keena, supra note 395, at 27 (citing Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437
U.S. 340 1982)). In at least one case, the Court bypassed such concerns when the party
seeking discovery of the computer system agreed to "bear the cost of recovering deleted
computer data." The Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 652 n.6 (D.
Minn. 2002).
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absent an express request by the party or order of the Court. 427
Nonetheless, counsel should contemplate production of the documents in a
PDF format to avoid further discovery being conducted on the document's
metadata (electronic data regarding the document).42 8
D.

TRIAL ISSUES

While a full discussion of all conceivable issues concerning the usage
of e-mail at trial is beyond the scope of this article, counsel should be
prepared to deal with admissibility issues. The admissibility of e-mail
messages at trial is subject to the traditional test of relevance/prejudice
under Fed. R. Evid. 403 (and like constructed rules). 429 In the context of
employment litigation, the e-mail need not be recoverable for the testimony
about the e-mail, and subsequent conduct, to be admissible.43 °
Moreover, counsel can attempt to have the document admitted on the
basis of Fed. R. Evid. 801 (non-hearsay), Rule 803 (exceptions to the
hearsay rule), and Rule 807 (residual hearsay exception). Counsel should
also be well prepared to discuss authentication and hearsay exceptions.431
Although, objections to the medium itself as hearsay have been largely
abandoned.43

427. In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D. at 443. See also id. at 444,
n. 11 (party is not obligated to disclose that data is being transformed into computerized data
for trial preparation purposes).
428. Kenneth J. Withers, Presentation at the Iowa State Bar Association's Federal
Practice Seminar (Dec. 13, 2002).
429. Monotype Corp. PLC v. Int'l Typeface Corp., 43 F.3d 443, 449-50 (9th Cir.
1994).
430. Montagne v. State of Iowa Dep't of Pub. Safety, No. 4-98-CV-20694 (S.D.
Iowa).
431.
Keena, supra note 395 at 28.
432. It is noteworthy that the Ninth Circuit's rejection in Monotype of an e-mail
message under the business records exception to the hearsay rule (FED. R. EVID. 803(6)) has
been virtually abandoned in light of the advances of the technology. See, e.g., Burrell v.
United Healthcare Ins. Co., 2001 WL 873221 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (e-mail admissible to
demonstrate absence of bad faith); Barella v. Exch. Bank, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 167 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2000). See also FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2) (admissions by a party opponent); FED. R.
EVID. 804(b)(3) (statement against interest). See also Cloud Corp. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 021486 (7th Cir. Dec. 26, 2002) (discussing the Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7001, providing "a contract or other record relating to the
transaction shall not be denied legal effect merely because it is an electronic form" after
adoption of the Act in 2000); General Trading Int'l, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Nos. 021947 & 02-2064 (8th Cir. Feb. 24, 2003) (based upon the specific facts of the case the Court
affirmed the district court's determination which found e-mail responses were insufficient as
a matter of law to confirm an oral agreement to satisfy the statute of frauds found in the
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To the extent that the e-mail may have caused someone to act (or
refrain from an act), the e-mail could be offered for a purpose which does
not constitute hearsay. Statements which are offered to explain subsequent
conduct are not hearsay.4 33
In the event the court rejects counsel's proffer of evidence, counsel
must remember to make an offer of proof following exclusion of the
evidence in order to preserve the issue for appeal. 434 Failure to do so may
constitute waiver of the issue on appeal unless counsel can convince the
appellate court that both it and the district court were aware of the
"substance and significance of the excluded evidence. 435
E.

ETHICS

Some state ethics opinions strictly limit the use of e-mail by
counsel. 36 As one commentator notes, the majority of state lawyer
regulatory boards which have addressed the issue of the ethical use of email have found, "it is not unethical for an attorney to send confidential
information via e-mail.
However, many of these opinions include
qualifying language.'
In addition, the ABA's Center for Professional
Responsibility allows counsel the opportunity to review ethics opinions and
rulings.438 Obviously, counsel are bound by their jurisdiction's position on
the issue.439 Counsel must be cognizant of these issues as the discovery
and ethical issues created by e-mail will not be resolved any time soon.44°

Arkansas version of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1 U.L.A., § 2-201 (West 1989)).
433.
30 B. M. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE, § 7005
(2000); 7 J. ADAMS & J. WEEG, IOWA PRACTICE: EVIDENCE § 801.4 (2002-03).
434.
FED. R. EVID. 103(a).
435.
Reed, 134 F.3d at 355.
436.
See, e.g., Iowa Bd. of Prof'l Ethics and Conduct, Op. No. 97-01 (Sept. 18,
1997) (amendment to 96-01); Op. No. 93-33 (June 5, 1997); Op. No. 96-01 (Aug. 29, 1996)
(Rescinding
95-30);
Op.
No.
95-30
(May
16,
1996)
available at
http://www.iowabar.org/ethics.nsf. Cf. Minn. Lawyers Prof'l Responsibility Bd., Op. No.
19 (Jan. 22, 1999) (allowing e-mail usage).
437.
Thomas 0. Wells, Technology Tips: Delivering Documents Through E-mail-Is
it Safe, FLA B NEWS, July 15, 2000, at 21 (discussing various state rulings).
438.
Available at www.abanet.org/cpr/links.html.
439.
PRACTICE TIP: If it must be transmitted by way of e-mail, the communication
(like any other document) should be labeled "privileged and confidential" including
reference to any statutory authority.
440.
Some suggestion of a possible change in the rules regarding the discovery of email has begun. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts has undertaken a survey
concerning how to deal with electronic discovery issues. M. Ballard, Digital Headache,
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F.

THE JURISDICTIONS

1.

Illinois

The statute treats as confidential any:
[c]ommunications between a public body and an attorney
or auditor representing the public body that would not be
subject to discovery in litigation, in materials prepared or
compiled by or for a public body in anticipation of the
criminal, civil or administrative proceeding upon the
request of an attorney advising the public body, and
materials prepared or compiled with respect to internal
audits of public bodies.441
2.

Iowa
The Iowa Code preserves both privileges.

3.

442

Minnesota

Minnesota's statute allows for closed meetings to protect attorneyclient privilege. 44 3 The Data Practices Act protects the attorney-client
privilege. 44 The court's discovery rules protect attorney work product. 45

NAT'L L.J., Feb. 10, 2003, at A18. Nonetheless, any proposals to change the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure are years away. Id. See also Varchaver, supra note 296 (noting that by
the time the legal issues surrounding e-mail are resolved instant messaging will be the next
front).
441.
5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/7(n) (2000). See also 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/2(c)(11)
(2000) (closed meeting when considering litigation which is filed, probable, or imminent).
See also supra Part VI(A) regarding the attorney-client privilege.
442.
IOWA CODE §§ 21.5(c) and 22.7(4) (2001). See also supra § VI(A) regarding
the attorney-client privilege.
443.
MINN. STAT. §§ 13D.01(6)(b), 13D.05(3), 13D.02(9) (2001).
But see
discussion at supra notes 208-14 and accompanying text regarding Prior Lake Am. v.
Mader, 642 N.W.2d 729 (Minn. 2002) (limiting basis for invocation of attorney consultation
for government entities).
444.
Kobluk v. Univ. of Minn., 574 N.W.2d 436, 440 n.5 (Minn 1998). See also
supra Part VI(A) regarding the attorney-client privilege.
445.
MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.02(c). See also MINN. STAT. § 13.03(6) (2001).
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North Dakota

Attorney work product and consultation are protected
5.

South Dakota

Attorney work product and consultation are protected. 447
6.

Wisconsin

Attorney client-privilege exists between a public body and counsel." 8
CONCLUSION

Electronic communications can create a significant problem for
governmental entities if not handled correctly. These problems are
exacerbated by state open meetings and open records legislation. By being
aware of the potential issues at the outset, counsel and the public employer
can confront and plan for such issues rather than being "surprised" once the
issues arise and in all likelihood the damage has been done.

446.
N.D. CENT. Code § 44-04-19.1 (2001). See also supra Part VI(A) regarding the
attorney-client privilege.
447.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 1-25-2(3) & 1-27-3 (Michie 2001). See also supra
Part VI(A) regarding the attorney-client privilege.
448.
See Wis. Newspress v. Sch. of Sheboygan, 546 N.W.2d 143, 149 (Wis. 1996);
Journal/Sentine, Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Shorewood, 521 N.W.2d 165, 172-73 (Wis. Ct. App.
1994), review denied, 525 N.W.2d 733 (1994) (rejecting argument that attorney client
privilege would apply to an executed adopted settlement document). See supra Part VI(A)
regarding the attorney-client privilege. See also supra Parts I(F), II(F).
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APPENDIX A
IOWA CODE § 22.7 (2001).
Confidential records.
The following public records shall be kept confidential, unless
otherwise ordered by a court, by the lawful custodian of the records, or by
another person duly authorized to release such information:
1. Personal information in records regarding a student, prospective
student, or former student maintained, created, collected or assembled by or
for a school corporation or educational institution maintaining such
records. This subsection shall not be construed to prohibit a postsecondary
education institution from disclosing to a parent or guardian information
regarding a violation of a federal, state, or local law, or institutional rule or
policy governing the use or possession of alcohol or a controlled substance
if the child is under the age of twenty-one years and the institution
determines that the student committed a disciplinary violation with respect
to the use or possession of alcohol or a controlled substance regardless of
whether that information is contained in the student's education records.
2. Hospital records, medical records, and professional counselor
records of the condition, diagnosis, care, or treatment of a patient or former
patient or a counselee or former counselee, including outpatient. However,
confidential communications between a crime victim and the victim's
counselor are not subject to disclosure except as provided in section
915.20A. However, the Iowa department of public health shall adopt rules
which provide for the sharing of information among agencies and providers
concerning the maternal and child health program including but not limited
to the statewide child immunization information system, while maintaining
an individual's confidentiality.
3. Trade secrets which are recognized and protected as such by law.
4. Records which represent and constitute the work product of an
attorney, which are related to litigation or claim made by or against a
public body.
5. Peace officers' investigative reports, except where disclosure is
authorized elsewhere in this Code. However, the date, time, specific
location, and immediate facts and circumstances surrounding a crime or
incident shall not be kept confidential under this section, except in those
unusual circumstances where disclosure would plainly and seriously
jeopardize an investigation or pose a clear and present danger to the safety
of an individual.
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6. Reports to governmental agencies which, if released, would give
advantage to competitors and serve no public purpose.
7. Appraisals or appraisal information concerning the purchase of
real or personal property for public purposes, prior to public announcement
of a project.
8. Iowa department of economic development information on an
industrial prospect with which the department is currently negotiating.
9. Criminal identification files of law enforcement agencies.
However, records of current and prior arrests and criminal history data
shall be public records.
10. Personal information in confidential personnel records of the
military division of the department of public defense of the state.
11. Personal information in confidential personnel records of public
bodies including but not limited to cities, boards of supervisors and school
districts.
12. Financial statements submitted to the department of agriculture
and land stewardship pursuant to chapter 203 or chapter 203C, by or on
behalf of a licensed grain dealer or warehouse operator or by an applicant
for a grain dealer license or warehouse license.
13. The records of a library which, by themselves or when examined
with other public records, would reveal the identity of the library patron
checking out or requesting an item or information from the library. The
records shall be released to a criminal or juvenile justice agency only
pursuant to an investigation of a particular person or organization suspected
of committing a known crime. The records shall be released only upon a
judicial determination that a rational connection exists between the
requested release of information and a legitimate end and that the need for
the information is cogent and compelling.
14. The material of a library, museum or archive which has been
contributed by a private person to the extent of any limitation that is a
condition of the contribution.
15. Information concerning the procedures to be used to control
disturbances at adult correctional institutions. Such information shall also
be exempt from public inspection under section 17A.3. As used in this
subsection disturbance means a riot or a condition that can reasonably be
expected to cause a riot.
16. Information in a report to the Iowa department of public health,
to a local board of health, or to a local health department, which identifies a
person infected with a reportable disease.
17. Records of identity of owners of public bonds or obligations
maintained as provided in section 76.10 or by the issuer of the public bonds
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or obligations. However, the issuer of the public bonds or obligations and a
state or federal agency shall have the right of access to the records.
18. Communications not required by law, rule, procedure, or contract
that are made to a government body or to any of its employees by identified
persons outside of government, to the extent that the government body
receiving those communications from such persons outside of government
could reasonably believe that those persons would be discouraged from
making them to that government body if they were available for general
public examination. As used in this subsection, "persons outside of
government" does not include persons or employees of persons who are
communicating with respect to a consulting or contractual relationship with
a government body or who are communicating with a government body
with whom an arrangement for compensation exists. Notwithstanding this
provision:
a. The communication is a public record to the extent that the
person outside of government making that communication consents to its
treatment as a public record.
b. Information contained in the communication is a public record to
the extent that it can be disclosed without directly or indirectly indicating
the identity of the person outside of government making it or enabling
others to ascertain the identity of that person.
c. Information contained in the communication is a public record to
the extent that it indicates the date, time, specific location, and immediate
facts and circumstances surrounding the occurrence of a crime or other
illegal act, except to the extent that its disclosure would plainly and
seriously jeopardize a continuing investigation or pose a clear and present
danger to the safety of any person. In any action challenging the failure of
the lawful custodian to disclose any particular information of the kind
enumerated in this paragraph, the burden of proof is on the lawful
custodian to demonstrate that the disclosure of that information would
jeopardize such an investigation or would pose such a clear and present
danger.
19. Examinations, including but not limited to cognitive and
psychological examinations for law enforcement officer candidates
administered by or on behalf of a governmental body, to the extent that
their disclosure could reasonably be believed by the custodian to interfere
with the accomplishment of the objectives for which they are administered.
20. Information concerning the nature and location of any
archaeological resource or site if, in the opinion of the state archaeologist,
disclosure of the information will result in unreasonable risk of damage to
or loss of the resource or site where the resource is located. This
subsection shall not be construed to interfere with the responsibilities of the
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federal government or the state historic preservation officer pertaining to
access, disclosure, and use of archaeological site records.
21. Information concerning the nature and location of any
ecologically sensitive resource or site if, in the opinion of the director of
the department of natural resources after consultation with the state
ecologist, disclosure of the information will result in unreasonable risk of
damage to or loss of the resource or site where the resource is located. This
subsection shall not be construed to interfere with the responsibilities of the
federal government or the director of the department of natural resources
and the state ecologist pertaining to access, disclosure, and use of the
ecologically sensitive site records.
22. Reports or recommendations of the Iowa insurance guaranty
association filed or made pursuant to section 515B.10, subsection 1,
paragraph "a", subparagraph (2).
23. Information or reports collected or submitted pursuant to section
508C.12, subsections 3 and 5, and section 508C.13, subsection 2, except to
the extent that release is permitted under those sections.
24. Records of purchases of alcoholic liquor from the alcoholic
beverages division of the department of commerce which would reveal
purchases made by an individual class "E" liquor control licensee.
However, the records may be revealed for law enforcement purposes or for
the collection of payments due the division pursuant to section 123.24.
25. Financial information, which if released would give advantage to
competitors and serve no public purpose, relating to commercial operations
conducted or intended to be conducted by a person submitting records
containing the information to the department of agriculture and land
stewardship for the purpose of obtaining assistance in business planning.
26. Applications, investigation reports, and case records of persons
applying for county general assistance pursuant to section 252.25.
27. Marketing and advertising budget and strategy of a nonprofit
corporation which is subject to this chapter. However, this exemption does
not apply to salaries or benefits of employees who are employed by the
nonprofit corporation to handle the marketing and advertising
responsibilities.
28. The information contained in records of the centralized employee
registry created in chapter 252G, except to the extent that disclosure is
authorized pursuant to chapter 252G.
29. Records and information obtained or held by independent special
counsel during the course of an investigation conducted pursuant to section
68B.34. Information that is disclosed to a legislative ethics committee
subsequent to a determination of probable cause by independent special
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counsel and made pursuant to section 68B.31 is not a confidential record
unless otherwise provided by law.
30. Information contained in a declaration of paternity completed
and filed with the state registrar of vital statistics pursuant to section
144.12A, except to the extent that the information may be provided to
persons in accordance with section 144.12A.
31. Memoranda, work products, and case files of a mediator and all
other confidential communications in the possession of a mediator, as
provided in chapters 86 and 216. Information in these confidential
communications is subject to disclosure only as provided in sections 86.44
and 216.15B, notwithstanding any other contrary provision of this chapter.
32. Social security numbers of the owners of unclaimed property
reported to the treasurer of state pursuant to section 556.11, subsection 2,
included on claim forms filed with the treasurer of state pursuant to section
556.19, included in outdated warrant reports received by the treasurer of
state pursuant to section 25.2, or stored in record systems maintained by the
treasurer of state for purposes of administering chapter 556, or social
security numbers of payees included on state warrants included in records
systems maintained by the department of revenue and finance for the
purpose of documenting and tracking outdated warrants pursuant to section
25.2.
33. Data processing software, as defined in section 22.3A, which is
developed by a government body.
34. A record required under the Iowa financial transaction reporting
Act listed in section 529.2, subsection 9.
35. Records of the Iowa department of public health pertaining to
participants in the gambling treatment program except as otherwise
provided in this chapter.
36. Records of a law enforcement agency or the state department of
transportation regarding the issuance of a driver's license under section
321.189A.
37. Mediation documents as defined in section 679C.1, except
written mediation agreements that resulted from a mediation which are
signed on behalf of a governing body. However, confidentiality of
mediation documents resulting from mediation conducted pursuant to
chapter 216 shall be governed by chapter 216.
38. a. Records containing information that would disclose, or might
lead to the disclosure of, private keys used in a digital signature or other
similar technologies as provided in chapter 554D.
b. Records which if disclosed might jeopardize the security of an
electronic transaction pursuant to chapter 554D.
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39. Information revealing the identity of a packer or a person who
sells livestock to a packer as reported to the department of agriculture and
land stewardship pursuant to section 202A.2.
40. The portion of a record request that contains an internet protocol
number which identifies the computer from which a person requests a
record, whether the person using such computer makes the request through
the lowAccess network or directly to a lawful custodian. However, such
record may be released with the express written consent of the person
requesting the record.
41. Preliminary findings, reports of these preliminary findings, and
investigative reports of the state medical examiner, resulting from the
conducting of an autopsy. However, the date, time, specific location, and
immediate facts and circumstances surrounding a crime or incident, related
to a death that affects the public interest as defined in section 331.802, shall
not be kept confidential under this subsection, except if disclosure would
plainly and clearly jeopardize an investigation or pose a clear and present
danger to the public safety or the safety of an individual.
42. Information obtained by the commissioner of insurance in the
course of an investigation as provided in section 502.603, 523B.8, or
523C.23.
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APPENDIX B
5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/2(c) (2000):
Exceptions. A public body may hold closed meetings to consider the
following subjects:
(1) The appointment, employment, compensation, discipline,
performance, or dismissal of specific employees of the public body,
including hearing testimony on a complaint lodged against an employee to
determine its validity.
(2) Collective negotiating matters between the public body and its
employees or their representatives, or deliberations concerning salary
schedules for one or more classes of employees.
(3) The selection of a person to fill a public office, as defined in this
Act, including a vacancy in a public office, when the public body is given
power to appoint under law or ordinance, or the discipline, performance or
removal of the occupant of a public office, when the public body is given
power to remove the occupant under law or ordinance.
(4) Evidence or testimony presented in open hearing, or in closed
hearing where specifically authorized by law, to a quasi-adjudicative body,
as defined in this Act, provided that the body prepares and makes available
for public inspection a written decision setting forth its determinative
reasoning.
(5) The purchase or lease of real property for the use of the public
body, including meetings held for the purpose of discussing whether a
particular parcel should be acquired.
(6) The setting of a price for sale or lease of property owned by the
public body.
(7) The sale or purchase of securities, investments, or investment
contracts.
(8) Security procedures and the use of personnel and equipment to
respond to an actual, a threatened, or a reasonably potential danger to the
safety of employees, students, staff or public property.
(9) Student disciplinary cases.
(10) The placement of individual students in special education
programs and other matters relating to individual students.
(11) Litigation, when an action against, affecting or on behalf of the
particular public body has been filed and is pending before a court or
administrative tribunal, or when the public body finds that an action is
probable or imminent, in which case the basis for the finding shall be
recorded and entered into the minutes of the closed meeting.
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(12) The establishment of reserves or settlement of claims as provided
in the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity
Act, if otherwise the disposition of a claim or potential claim might be
prejudiced, or the review or discussion of claims, loss or risk management
information, records, data, advice or communications from or with respect
to any insurer of the public body or any intergovernmental risk
management association or self insurance pool of which the public body is
a member.
(13) Conciliation of complaints of discrimination in the sale or rental
of housing, when closed meetings are authorized by the law or ordinance
prescribing fair housing practices and creating a commission or
administrative agency for their enforcement.
(14) Informant sources, the hiring or assignment of undercover
personnel or equipment, or ongoing, prior or future criminal investigations,
when discussed by a public body with criminal investigatory
responsibilities.
(15) Professional ethics or performance when considered by an
advisory body appointed to advise a licensing or regulatory agency on
matters germane to the advisory body's field of competence.
(16) Self evaluation, practices and procedures or professional ethics,
when meeting with a representative of a statewide association of which the
public body is a member.
(17) The recruitment, credentialing, discipline or formal peer review
of physicians or other health care professionals for a hospital, or other
institution providing medical care, that is operated by the public body.
(18) Deliberations for decisions of the Prisoner Review Board.
(19) Review or discussion of applications received under the
Experimental Organ Transplantation Procedures Act.
(20) The classification and discussion of matters classified as
confidential or continued confidential by the State Employees Suggestion
Award Board.
(21) Discussion of minutes of meetings lawfully closed under this
Act, whether for purposes of approval by the body of the minutes or semiannual review of the minutes as mandated by Section 2.06.
(22) Deliberations for decisions of the State Emergency Medical
Services Disciplinary Review Board.
(23) The operation by a municipality of a municipal utility or the
operation of a municipal power agency or municipal natural gas agency
when the discussion involves (i) contracts relating to the purchase, sale, or
delivery of electricity or natural gas or (ii) the results or conclusions of load
forecast studies.

